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Foreword
The last two decades of the 20th century have brought substantial
change to California.  The population increased by over 10 million
people, with over 40 percent of that increase coming from other states
and countries.  An aggressive use of the initiative process slowly but
steadily reduced the per capita tax burden.  The state experienced its
deepest recession since the 1930s and then finished off the century with
an economic rebound that still defies a full explanation.  The Silicon
Valley has produced firms that have created and led the “new economy.”
Los Angeles, where no ethnic or racial group now constitutes a majority,
has come to symbolize the city of the new century.  At the same time,
fiscal conservatism, rapid growth, and public disinterest have combined
to put California’s public schools near the bottom of the national
distribution in spending per pupil.  Even so, sober projections place the
state’s population in 2020 near the 50 million mark—an increase of
some 15 million residents searching for the golden dream.  Given these
changes and projections, it is no wonder that policy analysts, government
officials, and political leaders have called for a major surge in
infrastructure investment to keep up with the ever-increasing demands.
Along with the rest of the nation, California faced a similar
infrastructure challenge in the post-war period.  The relentless demand
for streets, parks, schools, recreation areas, hospitals, and roads was
sustained through the 1960s and into the 1970s.  During that time,
California’s master plans for highways, water systems, and higher
education were admired around the world for their ambition and
foresight.  In Building California’s Future: Current Conditions in
Infrastructure Planning, Budgeting, and Financing, Michael Neuman and
Jan Whittington paint a rather different picture from the one California
presented to the world in the 1960s.  Today’s infrastructure needs, which
include computer and communications technologies, outstrip available
resources; decisionmaking is fragmented and biased toward individual
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projects rather than overarching objectives; the budgetary process does
not provide for substantive policy tradeoffs; and a greater number of
bureaucracies with no vision of the big picture compete for limited
funding.
Offsetting this gray portrait is the 1999 passage of AB 1473, which
requires the governor to submit annual five-year capital improvement
plans.  Beginning in 2002, these plans will include information
on specific projects, how they fit together, and how they are to be
financed.  Thus, the first steps toward a more thoughtful and public
decisionmaking process have been taken.  But we still have a long way to
go.  This report lays out the challenges the Department of Finance will
face as it takes on the daunting task of improving the capital planning
process.
This report and its companion, David E. Dowall’s California’s
Infrastructure Policy for the 21st Century:  Issues and Opportunities, are
PPIC’s first contributions to the infrastructure policy discussion.  Future
PPIC analyses will focus on ways to close the gap between California’s
infrastructure needs and available funding.  There is no more important
challenge facing the state as it copes with continued population growth
and widespread resistance to increased taxation.  We hope that these
PPIC reports help the state meet that challenge.
David W. Lyon
President and CEO
Public Policy Institute of California
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California’s history, landscape, and identity have been marked
indelibly by its large and sometimes controversial infrastructure.
Consisting of 20,000 owned and leased structures, 200 million square
feet of built space, and 2.5 million acres of property, that infrastructure is
worth an estimated $1 trillion.  Over the last decade, California has
replenished and repaired these assets at an annual rate of less than 1
percent.  As a result, identified infrastructure needs now exceed available
resources.  In response to this problem, the governor has charged the
Commission on Building for the 21st Century with investigating
financial options for narrowing the gap between identified needs and
available resources.
Although that charge is as complex as it is important, it is supported
by the widespread view that infrastructure plays a critical role in
maintaining California’s place at the leading edge of contemporary
society.  Yet in Sacramento and elsewhere, the current policy debate has
focused almost exclusively on finances:  in particular, on how much
money the state can borrow and spend to build and maintain its
infrastructure.  This focus neglects another important policy
consideration:  the way infrastructure decisions are made in the first
place.  A review of that process indicates that the state’s decisionmaking
apparatus is as complex in its own way as the infrastructure systems
themselves.
In examining this apparatus, this study seeks to understand how
California plans, budgets, and finances infrastructure at the state level.
Based on interviews conducted with policymakers between July and
September 1999, as well as a thorough review of the myriad of laws,
rules, and budgets, this report examines how departments, agencies,
interest groups, legislators, and the governor interact to produce and
prioritize infrastructure projects.  It also explores the links between state
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policy on the one hand and agency plans, programs, and projects on the
other.
From the Golden Years to e-Gov
Infrastructure decisionmaking in California has undergone a
noticeable change since the 1960s.  The prosperity of the post-war period
emboldened Californians to envision and build three grand systems:
aqueducts, highways, and universities.  Each of these systems was
planned and built by a single state agency with substantial federal aid.
Now this simplicity is unimaginable.  Whereas state government in 1960
consisted of 22 departments, today it includes 64 departments and eight
agencies.  Also, many more local and special interest groups now
participate in deciding what and where infrastructure should (and should
not) be built.
The definition of infrastructure has also changed.  The term
originally referred to facilities built below the earth’s surface:  water,
sewer, steam, and drainage systems installed under streets.  Over time it
came to include public lands and buildings such as hospitals, schools,
firehouses, military bases, and courthouses.  Now infrastructure also
encompasses hardware and software systems that enable electronic
communication and commerce.  In addition to expanding over time, the
term has become more ambiguous with each statute, regulation, and bill
that offers a different and legally binding definition.  This ambiguity is
such that no two people interviewed for this study agreed on what is
meant by infrastructure.  Its ever-broadening scope and manifold legal
definitions have contributed to the difficulty of managing it effectively.
However infrastructure is defined, its planning is the province of the
executive branch.  As it stands today, however, the California Code
provides for almost no statewide planning.  Instead, most planning
occurs at the agency or department level.  Each department intuits its
own vision of the state’s future from various administration edicts,
executive orders, the State of the State Address, and the overall climate of
political opinion.  It then prepares a capital budget based on individual
construction projects.  These projects are described in Capital Outlay
Budget Change Proposals (COBCPs), which form the core of the capital
budget process.  Over the years, the departments and agencies
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responsible for the State Water Project, state highways, higher education
systems, and corrections facilities have earned varying degrees of freedom
from this process.  In general, however, budget proposals for individual
projects are sent two or more times through the annual budget process,
an 18-month stop-and-start affair in which the Department of Finance,
governed by the State Administrative Manual (SAM), pieces together the
departments’ capital budgets to form the state’s overall capital budget.
More than any other agency, the Department of Finance (DOF)
oversees infrastructure development from cradle to grave.  Although the
DOF is not technically responsible for prioritizing projects, its analysts
are the first to review COBCPs and work with departments and agencies
to determine program needs.  In doing so, DOF analysts have the
authority to reject or request changes to any aspect of the department’s
proposal.  The DOF also serves as the main point of contact between
proposing departments, offers project-by-project recommendations to
the governor before and after legislative review, and provides testimony
on infrastructure projects during the legislature’s budget hearings.  After
funding has been allocated, the DOF oversees the various stages of
project development through construction on behalf of the Public Works
Board.
In the absence of a unified administrative strategy, the annual budget
process prioritizes infrastructure projects by default.  Because identified
needs far exceed available funding, agencies and departments compete
fiercely for priority.  Toward that end, each agency and department uses
its own methods to plan and justify its budget.  The quality of the
information provided to the DOF varies according to the size, resources,
and expertise of a particular agency or department.  It also reflects the
degree to which that agency or department is committed to capital
management.  Management information systems for infrastructure are
scattered among central agencies, and the systems in use are at varying
stages of development and integration.  As a result of these and other
disparities, certain agencies are consistently rewarded while others wait
for much needed funds.
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Key Characteristics of Infrastructure
Decisionmaking
Three features characterize the state’s infrastructure decisionmaking
process.  The first is its project-orientation.  The state’s capital planning,
budgeting, and financing are conducted mostly project by project.  Each
department or agency prepares plans for specific capital projects such as
prisons, schools, bridges, or hospitals.  It then aggregates these proposals
and presents the list as its overall plan.  As a result of this approach,
California is relatively strong on project planning by individual agencies
and weak on statewide planning and strategy.  Indeed, the administration
lacks both an infrastructure planning culture and a legal structure to
enable it.  Instead, each agency has its own planning practices.  As state
government becomes more complex, the disparities across agencies carry
with them the costs of fragmentation.  In particular, coordination
becomes more expensive as departments, agencies, and other interest
groups proliferate.
The influence of the annual budget process is another feature of the
state’s approach to infrastructure decisionmaking.  Insofar as the system
is project-oriented, it is guided by the details of the budget process rather
than by broad policy goals.  Indeed, that process provides no formal
mechanism for evaluating projects against one another or matching them
to overarching state priorities.  Consequently, it rewards short-term
budget balancing rather than long-term asset management.  Because the
budget process is an annual snapshot, it does not anticipate or respond
well to changes in the business cycle.  As a result, the state loses the
ability to control construction costs and offset economic downswings
with public works spending.
The third major characteristic of infrastructure decisionmaking is the
overriding importance of financing.  Over and above the DOF’s role in
the annual budget process, finances tend to drive the system at every
stage.  Indeed, the availability of funds determines program needs rather
than vice versa.  This approach to infrastructure decisionmaking is
simple, easy to follow, and deceptive.  It tells the story backward by
defining social needs according to the state’s current budget.  It also
tends to neglect assessment and regular maintenance in favor of crisis
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management.  Finally, it emphasizes a single financial instrument, long-
term debt, and ignores other financial options that could help close the
gap between identified needs and available funds.  By focusing on a small
set of financial factors, the current approach avoids looking at
California’s infrastructure system as a whole.
Specific Findings
In addition to identifying the three key characteristics, our research
generated the following specific findings.
1.  Identified infrastructure needs outstrip available resources.  The
current policy debate proceeds from this consensus view.
2.  Infrastructure decisionmaking occurs in complex networks.  These
networks, which have developed incrementally, do not always serve
the state well.  Unraveling the whole that these interlocking
networks form—a kind of institutional surgery—is a painstaking
process.  Recent and current attempts at reform have cut open parts
but not the whole.  This piecemeal approach has been a direct
outcome of the bias of the system toward projects and the lack of a
statewide strategy.
3. The definition of infrastructure is changing.  Infrastructure used to
be pipes, wires, and roads provided by the government.  Now it
includes land and buildings, information systems and satellites, and
a spectrum of public and private services.  Ownership and
responsibility are less clear; partnerships and problems are more
common.
4.  Competition for infrastructure resources is the inevitable by-
product of project-based financing and budgeting.  In the absence
of big-picture planning, the legislature has become involved in
details rather than long-term leadership and oversight.
5.  A complicated formal system shapes the budget, but that system
lacks a mechanism for dealing with substantive tradeoffs.  The
current system relies on departmental planning, DOF oversight, and
legislative control over the budget.  The governor and legislature
lack the information necessary to easily compare needs across
xdepartments outside of the current budget year, or address issues
beyond financial feasibility, such as social, regional, or income
equality.
6.  There is no life-cycle framework for infrastructure.  The current
approach favors financing and budgeting over planning and
assessing.  As a result, it overvalues short-term planning and new
projects and undervalues maintenance.  Systematic, cradle-to-grave
planning is missing.
7.  The current system ignores the effects of the business cycle.  As a
result, the state cannot offset economic downswings or use
fluctuations strategically to control construction costs.
8.  Information for capital decisions is limited.  The State
Administrative Manual specifies the content of Capital Outlay
Budget Change Proposals, the core data in the budget process.  The
Capital Outlay and Infrastructure Report and the Debt Affordability
Report (typically) have provided a debt capacity orientation to
policymakers.  Departments’ five-year capital plans and strategic
plans are not part of legislative review of the budget, with the
exception of the Legislative Analyst’s Office.
9.  Information is erratic and biased in unpredictable ways.  Each
agency uses its own methods for planning and justifying its own
budget.  The quality of that information depends on the size,
expertise, and resources of the agency.
10. Resources dedicated to infrastructure management vary widely
among agencies.  There is no centralized source for training and no
centralized sources for the professional development of
infrastructure managers and staff.  Retaining expert staff, especially
project managers, is difficult in the face of private sector
competition in a strong economy.
Conclusions
We found that the state’s capital management system, like the
infrastructure system itself, manages to work but needs repair and
updating.  The collectivity of organizations that manage infrastructure in
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California is not seamless.  For the most part, agencies plan and operate
independently.  Networks are fragmented, coordination is limited, and
evidence of decentralization and devolution is mounting.  Some parts of
the system are sound but would benefit from a clearer policy framework.
Others parts need a major overhaul.  We conclude that the transaction
costs associated with the current institutional deficiencies are
unsustainably high.  These costs are measured in the time, staff,
resources, information, and coordination required to manage programs.
A responsive institutional methodology would answer these challenges
with an open-systems architecture that values flow and coordination over
checkpoints and control.  This approach points to a new sort of
coordination agency, one that serves as a central information processor.
Although AB 1473 positions the DOF for just such a role, at the
moment there is no central processing, strategic thinking, or information
management system.  Instead, these functions are diffused among several
entities:  Finance, General Services, Treasury, and the governor’s office.
A responsive institutional design would incorporate the principles
outlined here by considering the roles and responsibilities of each player,
especially the structural and procedural links among them.
Keeping a loose and dispersed set of networks working together is
partly a matter of institutional design.  It is also a matter of having an
adaptable, accessible management information system that cuts across
organizational lines.  The passage of AB 1473 may mark a step in the
right direction, but its success hinges on the design of new implementing
regulations.  A framework with strong principles and a process that is
both iterative and interactive are better suited to California’s governance
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report—California’s Infrastructure Policy for the 21st Century:  Issues and
Opportunities, by David E. Dowall.  The authors are doubly indebted to
the many individuals who contributed to the success of both reports,
including Michael Teitz and Fred Silva at PPIC and the numerous
interviewees listed in Appendix A.  Special mention must be given to the
Department of Finance staff, especially Fred Klass, Jim Tilton, Sue Bost,
and Karen Finn, who dedicated a significant investment in time
explaining the subtleties of the capital process, and to Pat Drohan and
Bob Remen.  We would like to further recognize the efforts of Gerald
Beavers, Sue Bost, Marc Carrel, Karen Finn, and Jim Tilton, who served
as technical reviewers on this report and whose comments and
suggestions significantly enhanced its quality.  Although this report
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11. Introduction
California’s large and sometimes controversial infrastructure projects
are an indelible part of its history, landscape, and identity.  The Golden
Gate Bridge is an emblem of the Golden State.  Irrigation networks feed
a $29 billion food and agriculture breadbasket to America.  Huge water
canals quench the thirst of 20 million Southern Californians living in
two metropolitan areas in the desert.  With its extensive freeway system,
Los Angeles is growing into one of the largest urban areas on the planet.
Even before those freeways were built, the Red Car transit system paved
the way for the city’s development.  California has been the state where
“if you build it, they will come.”  Yet many Californians wonder, as they
have in previous years, whether the state can sustain its current level of
growth and also conserve its abundant natural resources, majestic scenic
beauty, and storied quality of life.
The answer depends in part on the state’s willingness to expand and
maintain its infrastructure, which consists of 20,000 owned and leased
structures, 200 million square feet of built space, and 2.5 million acres of
property (California Department of General Services, 1999a).  Although
a good portion of this year’s projected budget surplus has been allocated
to infrastructure expenditures, that allocation is a small fraction of the
total value of state-owned infrastructure, which probably exceeds $1
trillion.1  Over the last decade, the state has added to its massive
inventory by spending an average of  $2.83 billion annually—not all
from state revenues—on capital facilities (California Department of
Finance, 1999a, p. 42).  Accounting categories prevent the calculation of
an exact figure, but the state has also spent several billion dollars annually
____________ 
1The total value of the state’s capital assets has never been quantified.  Such a
calculation would require an appraisal of every property in state ownership.  The cost and
time to obtain this type of valuation is considered prohibitive by the Department of
General Services.
2to maintain its infrastructure.2  Thus, California has been replenishing its
stock of public works at an average annual rate of less than 1 percent.
Political and economic leaders have taken notice of current
infrastructure failings and future challenges.  In his State of the State
Address for 1999, the governor noted that “inadequate planning and
overburdened systems” define the state of affairs today.  He charged the
Commission on Building for the 21st Century to use infrastructure to
“enhance the quality of life . . . and grow the economy,” while noting
that we must “live within our means” to accomplish these goals.  In its
interim report of August 1999, the commission itself recognized that it
“will take a sustained financial commitment to reverse the effects of past
inaction.”  Other reports have advanced a similar view.  In its December
1998 report, Overhauling the State’s Infrastructure Planning and Financing
Processes, the Legislative Analyst’s Office both highlights major
shortcomings in the decisionmaking process and offers corrective
proposals.  The California Business Roundtable’s 1998 report, Building a
Legacy for the Next Generation, also recognizes that “investments in the
quality of our public facilities are a key determinant of the state’s
economic growth . . . and are essential elements in the quality of life.”
These and other noteworthy players have recognized both the varied and
critical roles that infrastructure plays today and the need to reform its
planning and financing.  They also recognize the dangers of continuing
existing trends in infrastructure planning and financing.
The Purpose of This Study
The current infrastructure debate in Sacramento proceeds from the
shared view that the state’s needs far outstrip available funding.  To date,
discussions on how to close that gap have focused almost exclusively on
how much money the state can borrow and spend to build and maintain
its infrastructure.  This approach is simple, easy to follow, and deceptive.
It tells the story backward by allowing the availability of funds to
determine “need,” especially in the case of transportation.  It emphasizes
a single financial instrument, long-term debt, and closes the door on
____________ 
2From the State of California (1999), and the California Department of Finance
(1999a).
3other financial options that could help eliminate the deficit.  By focusing
on a small set of factors, it also avoids looking at California’s
infrastructure system as a whole.  In short, the debate itself reflects deep-
seated problems with infrastructure decisionmaking.
This study addresses some of these problems by providing an
overview of how California plans, budgets, and finances its infrastructure
investments.  It begins by acknowledging the difficulty and complexity of
providing infrastructure to the seventh largest economy in the world.
That complexity can be detected in the images policymakers use to
describe the infrastructure system and the institutions that govern it.
Some of the policymakers we interviewed compared the system to a black
box; others preferred the classic metaphor of the blindfolded person and
the elephant.  Many conceived of it as a wheel, with the rim as the
framework, the hub as the control center, and the spokes as the line
agencies.  Some imagined the wheel as having a flimsy hub or rims, or
none at all.  Of those who described the state’s infrastructure system as a
puzzle, most admitted that they had no overall idea of how the pieces fit
together.  (In fact, no one we interviewed claimed to fully understand the
entire infrastructure process.)  Taken together, these descriptions,
comparisons, and metaphors highlight the complexity and opacity of
infrastructure decisionmaking at the state level.
With this complexity in mind, this report seeks to answer the
following questions:
• Is there an integrated, comprehensive, statewide system for
infrastructure planning, budgeting, and financing?  If so, how is
it structured, how does it work, and who is in charge?  Is there
sufficient accountability in the system to ensure that mandates
are executed properly and that money is spent wisely?  Does the
system respond adequately to changing demands and conditions?
Are the usual checks and balances between the executive and
legislative branches in effect?  Are all appropriate interests and
players at the table?  Are the rules explicit, fair, and well
understood?  Are agencies and departments given the right
amount of authority to carry out their responsibilities?
4• How much of the state’s resources are devoted to infrastructure
planning, budgeting, and financing  How well is the state
managing those processes?  Are its decisions based on accurate,
complete, and timely information?  Is it retaining the requisite
talent and expertise to see California into the 21st century?
• How is infrastructure prioritized within and among agencies?
Are there trends in infrastructure prioritization or
decisionmaking that cut across many agencies?  If so, what are
they, and how might they affect overall state governance?  Do
these trends enhance or diminish returns on infrastructure
investments?
• What is the overall growth strategy of the state, and how are
infrastructure investments used to support that strategy?  What
are the links between this strategy on the one hand and agency
plans, programs, and projects on the other?
Although ambitious in their scope, our questions leave aside a
number of important issues.  The report does not evaluate the condition
of existing infrastructure in California, the methods used for calculating
the need or demand for new infrastructure, or the dollar amounts quoted
as needs or demands.  Nor does it study infrastructure institutions at the
local and regional levels.  Rather, it focuses squarely on infrastructure
decisionmaking and governance at the state level.
How This Research Was Conducted
Our method was direct and straightforward.  We talked in depth
with experienced actors.  We added to their knowledge by reviewing
statutes, regulations, and administrative procedures that govern
infrastructure.  We examined agency plans, strategies, program
documents, and budgets.  We downloaded and analyzed gigabytes of
data from the web.  We reviewed past reports and studies on California’s
infrastructure, and supplemented this vast store of information with
professional and theoretical readings from leading infrastructure scholars
and practitioners.  Finally, we tempered this information with our own
experiences as infrastructure researchers and practitioners.  Gaps in our
knowledge exist—an obvious one is the omission of legal materials and
5court rulings—yet we hope such shortcomings will be balanced by the
report’s unique perspective.
The Structure of This Report
This study has five remaining chapters.  In addition to reviewing the
previous literature on California’s infrastructure, Chapter 2 explores the
changing nature of infrastructure:  what it is today, what it was in the
past, how its definition has evolved over time, and what those changes
have meant for state governance.  Chapter 3 examines the big picture of
infrastructure decisionmaking in Sacramento, focusing on the capital
outlay budget process.  Chapter 4 reviews and analyzes infrastructure
planning as it is done by state agencies and the central administration.
Chapter 5 explores capital budgeting in the context of planning and
policy.  Chapter 6 presents our conclusions and their policy implications
as well as ideas for future research and institutional reform.
72. Definitions and Past Studies
The Evolution of the Term
Consider the origins of the term infrastructure.  Synonymous with
the word base, it first referred to facilities built below the earth’s surface:
water, sewer, steam, and drainage systems installed under streets.  Large
capital-intensive monopolies, such as highways, other transportation
facilities, water and sewer lines, and communications systems, are readily
apparent examples of infrastructure.  For this reason, the World Bank’s
definition of infrastructure includes utilities (gas and electricity, water
supply, telecommunications, sewerage, and waste collection and
disposal), public works (roads and major dam and canal works for
irrigation and drainage), and other transport sectors (railways, ports,
waterways, and airports).  Over the past century, the increasing
complexity of the built world has both expanded and blurred the
meaning of the term.  Broader definitions often include facilities for
safety, health, and welfare, such as military bases, prisons, schools,
hospitals, recreational facilities, and research laboratories.  The
interpretation most commonly applied, however, is the narrowest and
easiest to measure: systems owned by the public sector (Gramlich, 1994;
World Bank, 1994, 1999).1
____________ 
1The World Bank is an institution designed, by and large, for the effective delivery
of infrastructure finance.  The World Bank’s definition of infrastructure draws on the
work of development economists, who have used the term as an umbrella for social
overhead capital.  “Capital” is the money or property that is owned or used in the course
of doing business. “Overhead” refers to costs that are not directly used in the production
or sale of goods or services.  “Social” applies to money and property that serves the life
and welfare of the community or society, as opposed to individual interests (Merriam-
Webster, 1978; World Bank, 1994; Downes, 1991; Random House, 1996).
8In California, even this narrow definition leaves ample room for
interpretation.  The State of California (along with its regional and local
government jurisdictions) owns, operates, or helps finance a wide range
of facilities in many sectors.  All these sectors show varying degrees of
private involvement, and almost all of them are in a state of flux.  For
example, the Department of Transportation constructed and managed all
highways until recently, when private toll road projects were approved.
The state’s ports and airports have grown through significant private
sector contributions from ocean carriers and airlines, but they are
managed by quasi-public agencies with reporting requirements to
regional and state agencies.  The state maintains three vast systems of
public higher education (the University of California, the California
State University, and California Community Colleges) but also provides
financing for the development of private colleges through the state
treasurer’s California Education Facilities Authority.
According to the most exact specification available, § 3.00 of the
Budget Act defines capital outlay as “acquisitions of land or other real
property, major construction, improvements, equipment, designs,
working plans, specifications, and repairs necessary in connection with a
construction or improvement project.”  This nominally relegates some
aspects of capital construction—namely, repair and maintenance—to the
support budget, though in practice repair and maintenance are funded by
all three appropriation channels: capital outlay, support, and local
assistance.
In addition to these sorts of capital outlays, infrastructure has come
to include systems or services that the state provides for its operations,
such as radio frequencies used by the California Highway Patrol and
maintained by the Department of General Services, that fall under
broader definitions of infrastructure.  Another example is the Stephen
Teale Data Center’s management of servers on the Internet for
government agencies.  Such services have led to the development of new
terms such as virtual infrastructure, wireless infrastructure, and portable
infrastructure, which refer to cellular phones, wireless modems, the
Internet, and other new technologies.  Although “wireless infrastructure”
sounds like an oxymoron, these services also require developed facilities
such as satellites, receiving and transmitting towers, and switching
9systems.  One of the only sectors that the state does not occupy,
maintain, or support is cellular telephone service, but even this service is
a subject of note for the Commission on Building for the 21st Century.
The state’s Government Code does not simplify the terminology.
The phrases public works, capital facilities, capital improvements, public
facilities, utilities, public utilities, community facilities, public
development facilities, and infrastructure are all qualified in various ways,
with each statute providing its own legally binding definition.  As a
result, nearly every person interviewed for this study offered a different
definition of infrastructure.  Some were guided by their department’s
administrative regulations, such as the Department of Finance’s use of
the term capital outlay, but most allowed for broader interpretations and
considered the term to be in a state of flux.
The Golden Years
However infrastructure is defined, discussions of its history in
California tend to stress the “post-war boom” or the “Brown years.”
Reverence for this period is understandable, as many state policymakers
grew up in that time of plenty (Strauss and Howe, 1991).  Between 1940
and 1970, California’s population more than doubled, and government
officials focused on providing infrastructure to serve this new population.
As our interviewees have noted, California was still viewed as a great
frontier during this time, when a small number of leaders decided on
projects of extraordinary scope.  The most obvious examples of such
projects were the aqueducts, highways, and state college systems.
Water supply investments from the turn of the century, such as
Colorado River water delivery to Southern California, construction of
the Los Angeles Aqueduct, and delivery of the Hetch Hetchy Valley
water to San Francisco, were the first of many investments to move water
to the cities and farms.  By 1951, most of the 20 reservoirs and 11 power
plants of the federally managed Central Valley Project were completed.
In 1957, the California Department of Water Resources published the
California Water Plan, the first in a series of five-year plans continued to
this day.  It called for the immediate construction of the Feather River
Project, later renamed the State Water Project.  Supported by the voters
through the Burns-Porter Act of 1960, the State Water Project has since
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grown to include 22 dams and reservoirs.  The 444-mile long California
Aqueduct now holds the title of “Edmund G. Brown California
Aqueduct” (Water Education Foundation, 1997).
Between 1947 and 1963, the California gasoline tax was raised six
times and the federal tax three times.  Meanwhile, the number of cars on
the road increased dramatically, providing an ample revenue stream to
fund the Federal Highway Administration’s Interstate System and the
California Highway Commission’s State Freeway System.  The
California Division of Highways (Caltrans’s predecessor) was first and
foremost a highway building organization.  Framed by the 1959
California Freeway System Plan, its narrow mission and steady revenue
stream allowed it to create a vast web of thousands of miles of freeway
across the state.  California’s freeways expanded quickly during this
period and peaked in 1966, the year of Ronald Reagan’s election as
governor (Taylor, 1995, p. 45).
The University of California is another crowning achievement, with
32 Nobel Prizes awarded to faculty, academic study areas in more than
150 disciplines, and more research leading to patented inventions than
any other public or private research institution.  The University of
California was founded in 1868 as a public, state-supported land grant
institution, written into the State Constitution as a public trust under the
authority of an independent governing board, the Regents of the
University of California.  The Berkeley, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and
Davis campuses were all founded by the turn of the century, and the
remaining five campuses, in San Diego, Santa Barbara, Irvine, Riverside,
and Santa Cruz, were founded before 1965 in anticipation of the post-
war baby boom.
Although editorials invoke the memory of these “golden years,” long-
term government insiders are quick to point to changes in circumstances
that make such projects practically impossible to realize now.  Inflation,
design standards, rising labor costs, and new programs competing for the
same funds had not yet taken their toll.  The National Environmental
Policy Act and the California Environmental Quality Act had yet to
include the public in project deliberations.  A host of new laws, from the
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act to the Endangered Species Act, remained to
be written.  And no one in the golden years had to contend with the
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effects of Proposition 13, much less Proposition 98, which squeezed
funding for local governments and school districts, pushing them toward
state assistance and submitting them to state control.  As the history of
the water, highway, and state college systems has shown, these and other
factors caused the state to spend more money for fewer results.
After the Golden Years
The Department of Water Resources, secured by continuous
appropriations and contracts with local water districts for the State Water
Project, can spend tens of millions of dollars to plan a project that may
never be built.  Since the establishment of the Endangered Species Act,
the Department of Water Resources has yet to receive a biological
opinion of no jeopardy for a protected species, a hurdle in project
approval.  The department faces similar problems with urban voters and
the agricultural lobby, which played a part in the defeat of the 1982
ballot initiative for the Peripheral Canal, a project identified in the State
Water Plan.
Still obligated to meet growing water demands for an increasingly
participative public, the Department of Water Resources now seeks to
establish what some call state-of-the-art water planning.  In 1994, after
nearly half a decade of preliminary work, federal and state officials signed
an accord that called for a cooperative and coordinated process to solve
long-standing water quality and supply and ecosystem problems in the
San Francisco Bay-San Joaquin Delta estuary.  A collection of state and
federal agencies known as CALFED manages the effort, which is still in
the planning stages.  CALFED represents a stage in institutional
development where the web of agencies and interests engaged is
beginning to resemble the network of water facilities itself, reaching as it
does into all corners of California.  Subject to multiple forces that were
absent decades ago, it still must gain the legislature’s assent and face up
to the complex and competing political interests that surround major
water issues in California.  CALFED itself has spent $50 million in
planning studies and coordination since 1995, including $25 million for
the Los Baños Grande Reservoir alone.
In 1976, the California Division of Highways, once part of the
Department of Public Works, was organized into its own department
12
and renamed Caltrans.  This reorganization occurred one year after
Governor Jerry Brown announced a shift in priorities from new highway
construction to operational improvements of the existing system and the
expansion of public transit.  In retrospect, this policy shift was probably
late in coming.  In the 10 years leading up to 1976, a myriad of factors
had almost decimated new highway funding.  These factors include
inflation, increased vehicle fuel efficiency, labor unionization, higher
uniform design standards, skyrocketing right-of-way costs, competitive
construction markets, strong demand for construction materials,
increased maintenance loads, new environmental planning costs,
relatively decreasing federal revenues, and a lack of state legislative
support for fuel tax increases.  The funding required to expand highway
construction simply did not exist.  New funds, such as the 1/4¢ state
sales tax in 1971, were dedicated to the transit sector (Taylor, 1995).
The continuous budget appropriations afforded for highways through
the 1950s and 1960s ended in the mid-1970s.
Relatively low funding for highways continued for nearly 15 years.
In 1982, a 2¢ per gallon tax increase passed; 1¢ was for local roads and
1¢ was for matching federal interstate funds, leaving little for state
projects.  In 1989, the gas tax doubled to 18¢ per gallon, but the era of
massive highway building was over.  More transportation funds went to
transit and other modes than before.  Also, more state and federal dollars
were passed through to the regions and localities, and local governments
began raising their own funds.  To date, 18 counties have authorized
sales taxes for transportation.
The campuses of the University of California received dramatic
reductions to their state budget in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Maintenance was deferred, fees were raised, and private sources were
pressed for contributions.  For some campuses, such as Berkeley or Los
Angeles, the age and intensive use of many buildings and infrastructures
made the need for maintenance evident.  For all, the need to continually
update research laboratories to meet cutting-edge standards remained a
priority, but funds could not keep up with an enrollment expansion of
over 30,000 new students in the 1980s.
After a brief period of recovery in the 1980s, state allocations to the
university were reduced severely in the 1990s.  It was hard to anticipate,
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much less absorb, the extra construction, maintenance, and rehabilitation
costs that arose from damage and changing design standards due to the
Loma Prieta, Northridge, and Kobe earthquakes.  Even with Federal
Emergency Management Agency funds and donor support, this challenge
is still stretching campuses to their limits.  Added to these needs are two
capital-intensive endeavors: enrolling 45,000 new students by the year
2010 and raising the number of engineering and science graduates by 40
percent (University of California, Office of the President, 1998a).
Rising costs, limited revenues, and broader services are only part of
the picture for the Department of Water Resources, Caltrans, and the
University of California.  Proposition 13 and related initiatives, such as
caps on developer fees and exactions, have weakened local revenues and
prompted local officials to press the legislature for more support.  At the
same time, new programs at the state level are competing for the same
General Fund resources.  The Department of Corrections engaged in a
flurry of new prison construction, the war on poverty devoted significant
funds to welfare, and K–12 educational facilities received funding
guarantees.
Attempts to Mend the Gap
Over the last two decades, published reports have called for more
attention to facility maintenance, rehabilitation, and expansion.
Virtually all such studies use the same rhetoric and methodology.
Deferred maintenance has created numerous “crises” for the state, leaving
an enormous “gap” between “needs” and “available funds.”  Although a
comprehensive review of previous research is not within the scope of this
study, a glimpse of the findings of some should prove helpful to those
participating in today’s infrastructure debate.
In October 1982, Karsten Vieg and Diane Thomas of the Assembly
Office of Research published Public Improvements in California:
Preparation for Legislative Action, which noted several recent national
studies on “the decline of America’s public works.”  It also noted concern
for the difficulties in city and county financing since Proposition 13.
Vieg and Thomas’s proposal announced the office’s intention to
complete an inventory of California’s “capital replacement, repair and
rehabilitation needs” for “public facilities,” with an eye toward certain
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“administrative, management, or statutory reforms,” alternative methods
of financing, short- and long-term needs, and the merits of more
systematic policies for “public improvement” programs.
This proposal resulted in a report published in three volumes over
the next two years.  In 1983, Diane Thomas and Deborah Agata
published Volume Two, California’s Infrastructure: An Analysis of Selected
Trends (California Legislature Assembly, Office of Research, 1984c),
which presented the results of a survey of 766 public works officials
across the state on the current condition of facilities, dollar needs, and
revenues received since the passage of Proposition 13 (1976–1977).
True to their concern for local government, the researchers created their
own category of infrastructure, “intrinsic infrastructure,” to which they
included flood control, local water distribution, sewage systems, solid
waste management facilities, county roads and streets, and public transit.
Few if any of these categories were considered to be the focus of state
government at that time.
In what is probably a related turn, Governor Deukmejian suggested
the formation of a task force to review California’s infrastructure needs
and to suggest ways to meet present and future deficiencies.  This rather
large task force (38 members) consisted of the state treasurer, senators
and members of the assembly, directors of various state departments,
utility and private industry representatives, local officials, an organized
labor representative, a California State University chancellor, a school
principal, a professor, and an attorney.  They were charged with
producing their report by April 1984.
In the meantime, the Assembly Office of Research’s Karsten Vieg
and Frank Trinkl published Volume One and the Executive Summary of
their aforementioned study, which they entitled Rusty Hinges on the
Golden Gate.  Released on January 23, 1984, these publications
extrapolated the 438 completed surveys of the state’s needs for “intrinsic
infrastructure” (from Volume Two) to cover the whole state.  Curiously,
in the short amount of time between publishing Volumes Two and One,
the office saw fit to include state highways in their definition of “intrinsic
infrastructure,” for which they received one completed survey.
Although limited to the infrastructure concerns of local
governments, Vieg and Trinkl’s analysis was detailed.  They noted that
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county roads, city streets, and the sewage systems of several large cities
deserved attention, and that the life expectancy of other facilities could
be prolonged with routine maintenance.  They also concluded, however,
that a considerable amount of investment in wastewater treatment and
solid waste facilities would be necessary to serve expected population
growth.  Their findings suggested that infrastructure has “low visibility”
in the political arena, relies excessively on the “year to year caprice of the
federal government,” creates excessive burdens for new home buyers, and
suffers from organizational constraints in planning and management as
well as a severe lack of reliable data.
In the end, Vieg and Trinkl quantified the gap between needs and
available funds and pointed to the state for solutions.  They also
suggested several instruments for lending funds to local governments,
such as the “Public Improvements” fund and authority and the two new
bond programs (General Obligation and “CalWorks” Bonds).  The
administrative reforms they recommended included the clarification of
local versus state responsibilities, the elimination of costly administrative
regulations and engineering standards, the balancing of expenditure
patterns across sectors, protection against personal injury claims for
public works, and spending incentives for maintenance during times of
general economic duress.  Citing the complex nature of infrastructure
decisionmaking, they proposed a two-year infrastructure review process
for the governor (California Legislature Assembly, Office of Research,
1984a, 1984b).
Governor Deukmejian’s Infrastructure Review Task Force published
its report on April 15, 1984.  Its definition of infrastructure was vast,
covering public and private sector interests as well as several sectors that
are not under consideration today, such as low-level radioactive waste
disposal and the provision of petroleum fuel.  Its recommendations were
also extensive, covering financial, regulatory, and administrative options
for each sector under consideration.  Highways and wastewater treatment
plants were its most highly recommended public investments.  The task
force also considered various forms of private participation in what were
traditionally considered public services, including the privatization of
certain sectors of infrastructure (California State Infrastructure Review
16
Task Force, 1984).  Its estimated shortfall for infrastructure maintenance
and new investment was $51 billion.
These studies may have been the impetus for successful legislation
and administrative reform, such as the statutory framework for the
recently capitalized Infrastructure Bank (a recommendation from the
California Legislature Assembly, Office of Research), or the expansion of
Caltrans planning to include freight movement and other private sector
activities (a Deukmejian Infrastructure Review Task Force
recommendation).  They may also be related to more recent reports and
suggestions for reform from the Legislative Analyst’s Office, the
California Business Roundtable, and Governor Davis’s Commission on
Building for the 21st Century.  In any case, many of the same
considerations aired in these reports from the early 1980s are once again
on the table.
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3. Making Decisions About
Infrastructure
Has anything shaped California’s built landscape more than large-
scale infrastructure projects?  Post-war prosperity emboldened
Californians to envision and build three grand systems: aqueducts,
highways, and universities.  The systems were, and still are, the
cornerstones of the state’s economy and society.  It is difficult to imagine
any one of them, let alone all three at once, being attempted today.  Such
building is now rarer, more modest, and more incremental.  The
University of California, Merced, is scheduled to open its doors in 2005,
40 years after the establishment of the Irvine and Santa Cruz campuses.
This is the longest period between new campus openings in the 125-year
history of the UC system.  This fact is all the more remarkable given that
California’s population grew more in those 40 years than it did in its
entire history before that period.  Large water and highway projects
suffered a similar fate.  After the construction of the Central Valley
Project and State Water Project—mega-projects that enabled the rapid
growth of both Southern California and the state’s farm economy—
voters nixed the Peripheral Canal.  After paving 3,924 centerline miles in
the post-war years, freeway construction has ground nearly to a complete
halt since 1980, with only 214 centerline miles of new freeways built
since then.  Changes in social and environmental sensibilities, along with
public distaste for grand government schemes, have shifted the climate of
opinion regarding infrastructure toward smaller, more incremental
improvements.  Renovating, modernizing, and optimizing the use of
existing stocks has replaced providing new capacity as the overarching
goal of capital investment management.
In the post-war golden era, the state’s schools, roads, and aqueducts
were planned and built by three state agencies with substantial federal
aid.  Now this simplicity is unimaginable.  In 1960, there were 22 state
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departments; now there are 64 departments and eight state agencies.1
Nearly a dozen state and federal agencies have participated in the
CALFED water planning process for the Bay Delta alone, and scores of
secondary entities have labored alongside them.  After nearly a decade of
work, however, they have produced only a draft plan.  This proliferation
of agencies has come about partly because the state performs more
functions than it used to.  Another reason is that more agencies and
interest groups participate in the process of deciding how, what, and
where infrastructure should or should not be built.
In the mid-1990s, state departments were directed to prepare and
use strategic plans to guide their infrastructure investments.  These
strategic plans, however, often do not exist, are not current, or are not
used.  If a department lacks a strategic plan, or if the plan’s capital
investment component is not current, it may rely instead on state and
federal mandates, court settlements, and other policies.  In any case, there
is no overall state context for developing strategic plans.  Taken
collectively, they have questionable value in steering the world’s seventh
largest economy into the new millennium.
In the absence of a unified strategic vision, the budget process paints
a large part of the “big picture” for infrastructure by default.  Each
department intuits its own vision of the state’s future from various
administration edicts, executive orders, the State of the State Address,
and the overall climate of opinion.  It then colors that “vision” with its
own mission statement and policies as it prepares a capital budget.  The
department builds its capital budget from individual construction project
proposals.  The Department of Finance builds the state’s Capital Outlay
budget by piecing together the departments’ capital budgets.  It then
subjects these projects to the budget process.  Thus, the project-based
budget, an annual snapshot, attempts to replace the big picture, leaving a
wide and empty border.
The Big Picture
There are four pieces to the infrastructure decisionmaking puzzle in
California’s Capital:  planning, budgeting, financing, and project
____________ 
1State of California Budget for the Fiscal Year July 1, 1960, to June 30, 1961.
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management.  One piece, budgeting, stands far above the rest.  Line
departments prepare plans for horizons of five, 10, or even 20 years.
Projects are conceived by departments, reviewed and prioritized by the
Department of Finance, scrutinized by the governor’s office and
legislature, and placed in the Budget Act.  Nearly every state project
travels through the labyrinth known as the state’s budgeting process for
capital outlay as documented by the Department of Finance in the State
Administrative Manual (SAM).  In the absence of a central vision, or of
an administration plan or strategy, the SAM guides infrastructure
decisionmaking for the State of California.  Once approved by the
legislature, financing is arranged, often with the assistance of the
treasurer’s office.  Financing involves identifying the money to pay for
infrastructure projects and programs, drawing upon sources ranging from
long-term bonds, user fees, and dedicated taxes to federal grants and
loans.  Because it is very political, financing engages the legislature,
governor, treasurer, and the Department of Finance closely.
Project management begins after the project has been approved in
the budget cycle or at the ballot box.  Projects make their way through
design and construction, where most are managed by the Department of
General Services with oversight from the Public Works Board.  This
process is designed around three phases of appropriation: preliminary
plans, working drawings, and construction.  Projects generally pass
through twice (first design, then construction) in typical design-bid-build
fashion, but some go through three or more times for re-appropriations
(if progress is lacking) or augmentations (if the project is over budget).
Much like planning, project management is compartmentalized.  Line
departments typically manage projects in conjunction with the
Departments of General Services and Finance with little engagement
from the governor’s office or the legislature.
Certain departments have been given the authority to develop,
approve, fund, and manage their projects outside the state’s capital outlay
process.  These include the Department of Water Resources for the State
Water Project and the Department of Transportation and California
Transportation Commission for state highway projects.  These agencies
were granted their authority through special legislation in attempts to de-
politicize decisionmaking for these critical, statewide forms of
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infrastructure.  They rely on dedicated funding sources, such as local user
fees and the gas tax, instead of the General Fund.
Other departments participate in the capital outlay process but have
attained varying degrees of decisionmaking autonomy.  The University of
California (UC) and the California State University (CSU) systems have
certain types of projects that are not subject to legislative appropriation,
such as housing and student union programs.  In addition, some UC and
CSU projects go through only one approval cycle for preliminary plans,
working drawings, and construction appropriations.  They also can
manage their own contractors and use savings from one project to fund
another.  In doing so, however, they assume the risk of cost overruns.
Some politically sensitive projects, such as new prisons, are given
more detailed guidance on the part of the legislature and governor.
Others are introduced directly by legislators.  The latter often have the
support of a particular line department, but they may be carried through
the legislature to avoid comparative scrutiny against other budgetary
needs by the Department of Finance.  This method of introducing
projects treats the legislature as an escape valve, but it can also be used to
test new processes for project delivery, such as the current program for
“design-build,” which includes the Capitol Area East End Project in
Sacramento.2
Private projects are given approval for state financing through the
treasurer’s office.  Examples include funding for private higher education
from the California Education Facilities Authority and funding for
private and nonprofit hospitals from the California Health Facilities
Financing Authority.  The state also oversees the development of other
forms of private infrastructure, such as telecommunications, gas, and
electricity, with state agencies such as the California Public Utilities
Commission serving in a regulatory capacity.
Together, these processes constitute California’s system for
developing infrastructure.  What follows is a closer look at each of them.
____________ 
2Design-build is a form of contracting that lowers the cost and decreases the time to
develop a project by eliminating bidding processes between design and construction.  It
typically awards both design and construction to one contractor or one consortium of
contractors.
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The State Administrative Manual:  Playbook for the
State
“What the Department of Finance does is act as the fiscal
advisor to the Governor . . . it identifies the needs.”
James Tilton
Assistant Program Budget Manager
California Department of Finance
More than any other central agency, the Department of Finance
(DOF) follows infrastructure development from cradle to grave.  Its
statutory responsibility is to guide departments through the budgeting
and implementation of projects.  It is also the main point of contact for
the governor and prime representative of projects to the legislature.
The playbook used by the DOF and others in this process is the
State Administrative Manual (SAM).  The sections of the SAM pertaining
to infrastructure development refer to policies and procedures for
budgeting and financial administration of “capital outlay projects” or
“programs for capitalized asset financing,” including the “acquisition,
new construction, alteration and renovation or betterment of real assets”
(California DOF, 1998, § 6800–6899).
Careful examination of the SAM reveals a complicated network of
decisions, support, and responsibilities among departments, the DOF,
the Department of General Services (DGS), the governor’s office, and
the legislature.  This network eventually generates the annual Budget
Act.  One section of each Budget Act covers capital outlay, where
individual infrastructure projects and their estimated costs are itemized.
Figure 3.1 shows the voyage of infrastructure projects as they work their
way into or out of the capital outlay section of the Budget Act.  Three
phases are shown for this 18-month process.  The first focuses on the
DOF and departments, the second on the governor, and the third on the
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Figure 3.1—Sketch of the Budgetary Process
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Departments and the DOF in Dialogue
Departments (or “client” departments as they are referred to in the
SAM) begin the process of determining capital outlay for each budget
year.  Each determines infrastructure needs on a one-year and five-year
basis.  A project for the coming year is submitted in the form of a Capital
Outlay Budget Change Proposal (COBCP).  Five-year lists of projects
are known as Capitalized Asset Plans.3  All are submitted to the DOF by
February 1 of each year to be included in the following year’s state
budget.  COBCPs and Capitalized Asset Plans are prepared in stovepipe
fashion.  Departments look to their own mission statements—and, where
available, strategic plans—for guidance, along with recent executive and
court orders or other mandates.  They also may look at factors that affect
service delivery such as population projections or fluctuations in land use.
Each department uses a different methodology for determining the
scale, scope, and function of its projects.  Higher education systems, such
as the California Community Colleges, rely on population and
demographic projections to estimate future enrollment.  Those
enrollment projections are placed against existing capacity to determine
future needs.  The Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, in
contrast, moves its fire station locations in response to changing spatial
patterns of urban development.  Although all departments defer to the
DOF for population projections, there is little else in common between
departments’ estimations of infrastructure demands or needs.
Departments often try to revive projects that have been rejected by the
DOF in past years.  Some submit the same projects over several years.
Departments waiting for appropriations easily lose staff with
development expertise, as those people shift with the economic tide.
Constant rejection has led staff of one department to submit COBCPs
that simply referred the reader to last year’s submittals.  Departments
rarely, if ever, consult with one another.  They each see themselves as
____________ 
3Generally, capital outlay refers to state-owned infrastructure property acquisition,
construction, or improvement projects costing over $35,000 for design or $250,000 in
total cost, including lease agreements that build equity for the state.  They are
distinguished from minor projects, routine maintenance costs, and grants to local
governments for infrastructure development, each of which require less elaborate
processes of state approval and oversight (California DOF, 1998, p. 6805).
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delivering distinct infrastructure services or competing for the same
funds.  Only those agencies that act as control points in the budget
process, such as the DOF, provide linkages across departments.
In broad terms, the purpose of the COBCP is to justify funding
requests to the DOF.  COBCPs are at once problem statements,
explorations of alternatives, proposals of solutions, and collections of
details about those solutions.  According to the SAM, “The DOF will
consider only those proposals which convincingly meet all four of these
requirements” (California DOF, 1998, p. 6818).  Although departments
and agencies review their policies and budgets internally to justify new
projects or renovations, the DOF stands between those departments and
the governor.  The DOF’s statutory responsibility is to ensure the state’s
“long term financing needs in a manner which will protect the financial
integrity of the state” (Government Code § 13104).  This responsibility,
which allows the DOF to project the state’s 10-year capital outlay and
infrastructure needs, pervades its work.  As one DOF manager noted in
an interview, “I try to instill in my analysts that you have got to
understand the program, and you have got to understand the project.
[The department has to] convince you, and then you turn around and
convince me, . . . because the program is not going to testify on the
project.  We are going to testify on the project.”
Upon receipt of COBCPs in February, the DOF has nearly eight
months to study these programs and projects by holding scoping
meetings and site visits with the proposing department.  Because each
DOF analyst must review approximately 100 projects during that time,
the DOF often enlists the DGS for technical and cost advice.  The DOF
has the authority to reject or request changes to any aspect of a
department’s COBCP.  For a project to survive eight months of scrutiny,
it must be the right answer to a particular programmatic problem and its
ongoing expenses must be noted in out years of the department’s five-
year plan.4  The odds of being included in the Budget Bill remain low,
however, as departmental needs inevitably outstrip available budget funds
(as estimated by the DOF) and debt capacity (as estimated by the
____________ 
4Beginning with the 2000/2001 budget year, the project must also be tied to a
Strategic Plan.
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treasurer).  Thus, it helps to have experienced personnel championing the
project through the process, or even better, another potential source of
funding.
Insiders say that today’s system is more finance-driven than ever.
Thirty to 40 years ago, infrastructure projects could rely more on pay-as-
you-go bills or federal funds.  In the 1970s and early 1980s, those sources
were often augmented by earmarked funds, such as tideland oil revenues.
Earmarked funds have dwindled from a high of $400 million to a low
today of only a few million dollars per year, and federal funds for capital
outlay have dramatically declined as a percentage of state revenues
(interview and State of California, Governor Gray Davis, 1999, p. 22).
Scarcity of resources has intensified competition among a growing variety
of state needs—from education, water, and highways to health, natural
resource management, and corrections, among others.  Moreover,
departments tend to defer maintenance during recessions and scramble
to cover lost ground in growth years.
The state uses various forms of debt financing, such as general
obligation bonds, that require various forms of approval.  Accordingly,
the political climate and voter receptiveness have also become factors in
capital outlay decisions.  Indeed, the DOF must consider such factors in
the evaluation of COBCPs.  Although the DOF is not technically
responsible for prioritizing projects, it is the first to discuss the necessity
of each project with the proposing department.  Inevitably, the DOF
influences choices made within and among departments to match needs
against available dollars.  In effect, the DOF helps winnow the list of
projects until the needs can be met within the budget.  Exceptions to this
pattern include projects with dedicated funding by virtue of existing law.
Existing capital is also excluded from the equation, as the budget for
California is zero-based.
Department of Finance staff called this eight-month dialogue with
departments an exercise in “problem solving.”  All projects are supposed
to solve problems faced by each department in delivering services to
California’s citizens.  The dialogue therefore gravitates toward certain
questions.  What are the problems?  What are the options for solving the
problem?  Is this the most logical solution to the problem?  Are the
proposed design and cost estimates adequate?  What are the potential
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sources of funding?  Are there options that do not require additional
funding?  This line of inquiry could easily result in the consistent
reduction of projects to their lowest possible scope.  Indeed, proposals for
renovations and deferred maintenance are commonplace.  However, the
DOF is often concerned that the proposal would address only a
symptom of a problem and not its cause.  Such was the case with leaking
pipes and deteriorating walls in the shower room of a state prison.
Inmates had to walk through a maze of walls difficult for guards to
police, where flooding often occurred.  The department was concerned
about the immediate problem of flooding.  The DOF felt that the layout
of the building posed more of a safety hazard to guards and inmates than
the incidental flooding and urged the department to design and build a
new facility instead of renovating the old one.
Often COBCPs are rejected because the bricks and mortar proposed
are not explicitly aligned with the department’s staffing plans, policies, or
operating budgets.  The DOF’s logic is that changes to staffing have to
be approved before changes in facilities because it is the staffing that
determines how the facility will look and function.  A new Alzheimer’s
treatment unit for a veterans’ home was denied because approvals for the
program and staffing had not yet been obtained.  Similarly, the
Department of Food and Agriculture proposed to install a separate
station at the Nevada state line allowing pre-approved trucks to pass
through an infrared identification system without inspection.  Regardless
of technological merit, the program for determining pre-approval for
trucks was not yet documented, and the proposal was rejected.  These
links will be tightened further as departments have to demonstrate how
each project supports its strategic plan.
If a COBCP presents the right solution to the right problem, the
proposing departments’ five-year plans must also show the anticipated
needs for that project over time.  Capitalized Asset Plans prioritize and
justify all the projects anticipated over the next five years, delineating
requests for preliminary plans, working drawings, and construction.  In
terms of justification, departments are asked to present the five and 10-
year trends that are driving the expansion or reduction of demand for
facilities.  Because of its limited resources, the DOF spends more time
reviewing the five-year plans of agencies known for previous inaccuracies,
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or of those with complex leasing options.  One case is a recent five-year
plan for Caltrans, which showed requests for funding that would arrive
after existing leases had expired, potentially jeopardizing the budget and
schedule for a new project on those properties.
Departments with a recent history of project development are most
likely to have maintained enough staffing and expertise to undergo
careful determinations of need and to prepare adequate documentation.
But there is yet another aspect to this process.  Beyond the written page,
departments prefer to have someone who can explain to the DOF how
each project supports that department’s overall program.  In this era of
scarce resources, departments need people with the confidence and
credibility to negotiate effectively with the DOF.  Those who cannot
make their case persuasively present the DOF with three options:
working closer with the department to fill in the blanks, reducing the
scope of the project, or rejecting the department’s capital budget
altogether.  Such demands partially explain why certain departments
struggle to acquire the funding to retain necessary licenses or to meet
basic health and safety requirements.
This eight-month dialogue between the DOF and departments ends
in September of each year.  At that time, departments respond to the
DOF’s comments by submitting “technical updates” to their COBCPs,
along with estimates of 10-year needs by program and funding source.
These updates and estimates are compiled in the annual Capital Outlay
and Infrastructure Report.  Of the COBCPs that are not accepted, some
wait at least another year for appropriations, and others are proposed in
the spring process.  Some that require new designs or cost estimates may
wait an additional two years for appropriations.  Accepted COBCPs are
taken by the DOF into budget hearings with the governor in October
and November.
The Governor, the Legislature, and the Budget Bill
The budget process thus far has projects moving from specialists in
departments and agencies through infrastructure generalists in the capital
outlay division of the DOF and into the hands of the governor.
Informed by the DOF and a multitude of other sources, the governor
decides which COBCPs to include as items in the Budget Bill.  The one
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publication that comes closest to describing the governor’s priorities for
state investment is the Governor’s Budget Summary, also known as the
“A-pages.” California’s governors are free to determine the level of detail
provided in the A-pages.
Both Pete Wilson and Gray Davis have supported the use of surplus
revenue for infrastructure investment, but their A-pages have differed
markedly.  Wilson’s Budget Summary for the year 1998/1999 contained
an Infrastructure Initiative calling for $961 million in funding for capital
outlay, plus a bond program totaling $7 billion for education, the
infrastructure bank, correctional facilities, water, parks, and other forms
of infrastructure (State of California, 1998, p. 34).5  Governor Davis’s
Budget Summary for the year 1999/2000 cited the DOF, the California
Business Roundtable, and the Legislative Analyst’s Office in a section
devoted to building for the 21st century.  That section called for the
creation of a commission under the same name.  Except for education
(noted separately as Davis’s primary commitment), the A-pages suggest
that dollar amounts and priorities for infrastructure may be determined
by the commission between January 1999 and December 2000,
informing bond programs and budget analyses in the interim (State of
California, 1999, pp. 22–24).
The governor’s budget is released in the wake of budget hearings
with the DOF in early January.  Departments are authorized to release
the final COBCPs to the legislative staff and the LAO, and a whole new
phase of the budget process begins.
Legislative Debate over the Budget Bill
Like the governor, legislators are generalists, responsible for
evaluating all three components of the Budget Bill at once: capital outlay,
local assistance, and the operations of state government.  With the
assistance of the LAO and other organizations such as the Senate Office
of Research (SOR), they provide the checks and balances against the
governor and DOF.  They receive the governor’s budget on January 10
of each year.  Between early January and the end of February,
departments submit last minute changes to their COBCPs to the DOF
____________ 
5In the end, one bond for $9.2 billion was approved, dedicated to education.
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in the form of requests for Finance Letters.  The LAO prepares and
submits its annual Analysis of the Budget Bill to the legislature.  This
report is one of the few that raise capital outlay issues cutting across
functional departments.
In what may be the political core of the process, the contents of the
Budget Bill become the subject of negotiations between houses of the
legislature.  These negotiations are tempered by a general understanding
of what the governor is likely to approve or strike down with his line
item veto power.  Having begun in March, these debates continue
through approximately June of each year.  As the legislature holds budget
hearings in the senate and assembly chambers, it hears testimony from
the DOF (and others as necessary) on each COBCP included in the
Budget Bill.  In the course of its debates, the legislature makes use of the
A-pages, the Budget Bill, the Analysis of the Budget Bill from the LAO,
and Finance Letters from the DOF.
According to our interviews with legislative staffers, they do not use
(and in general lack access to), the five-year Capitalized Asset Plans
produced by each department.  The LAO summarizes five-year
Capitalized Asset Plans into a table format, showing five-year estimates
for each area of state government, the budget year requests by
department, and the amount proposed by the governor.  According to
the LAO, the governor’s budget used to include a separate document for
capital outlay, which included all five-year plans, but this practice ended
in the early 1970s (Beavers, 1999).  The absence of five-year plans in the
LAO’s analyses and the legislature’s deliberations is the subject of a
number of active bills.  This single point, when coupled with the
relatively open playing field of the annual budget, can easily leave the
state’s budget process unaware of looming, long-term investment issues
for infrastructure.  The restricted flow of information is one reason the
budget provides only an annual snapshot.
Term limits may exacerbate the issue.  Legislators today tend to be
new to the budget process, serving a maximum of six years in the
assembly and eight years in the senate.  Moreover, they may serve as
chairs of various subcommittees for only two to four years at a time.
Influenced both by term limits and the overall environment of scarcity
wrought by Proposition 13 (and others since), many legislators enter
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debates fresh from positions in local government and wish to garner
support for specific projects.  As a result, it is frequently difficult to raise
interest in basic infrastructure concerns such as renovations and deferred
maintenance.  Furthermore, many projects go through the budget
process at least two times: one for preliminary plans and working
drawings, and another for construction appropriations.  Of those that are
approved, many return to committees for further approvals and
augmentations.  Given the time horizons for such projects, turnover
among committee members can hinder continuity.  In most cases today,
the lives of projects are much longer than the terms of legislators.
According to the DOF, legislative committees review infrastructure
projects inconsistently.  Once they have approved the first phase of a
project, some committees spend little time reviewing proposals for
subsequent phases and focus instead on new projects.  Other committees
subject each phase of appropriation to the same detailed review, regardless
of previous appropriations.  Many insiders suspect that term limits will
result in more committees conducting painstaking reviews while inevitably
losing significant monitoring capabilities.  Before term limits, legislators
served as subcommittee chairs for a number of years in a row.  When capital
outlay projects were presented a second or third time, they remembered the
project and even knew the person responsible.  This arrangement provided
an added sense of accountability for the legislators and project managers
(especially from DGS and other large departments).  It was also a factor in
the monthly project monitoring by the Public Works Board, an entity
chaired by the director of the DOF and attended by the directors of
Transportation and General Services as well as the controller and treasurer
for revenue bond matters.  In past years, personal relationships based on
credibility, trust, and reciprocity played a key role in infrastructure
decisionmaking.  For those who now face the legislature for appropriations
each year, the future is less certain.
Closing the Process:  The Governor and
the Line-Item Veto
After the legislature has provided its two-thirds vote to approve the
Budget Bill, the governor, advised again by the DOF, reviews the bill.
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Line item veto power allows the governor to deny appropriations for
individual projects.  When exercising this power, the governor usually
provides some explanation for doing so.  Over the past two decades, the
Budget Bill has been replete with vetoes of capital outlay appropriations
accompanied by references to the scarcity of funds.  Whether in times of
plenty or scarcity, many see the annual budget process as cumbersome,
overly driven by finance, and weak on planning.  Some departments have
been afforded varying degrees of freedom from its multiple reviews,
inconsistent oversight, and 18-month duration.  These departments are
important pieces of the infrastructure puzzle.
Autonomy for Water Resources and Highways
Built almost entirely before 1970, the vast networks of dams,
aqueducts, and highways that spread across the state today are part of its
history.  The autonomy afforded to their keepers, the DWR and
Caltrans, is equally a part of history.
California has more than 1,800 water districts.  Large and small,
agricultural and urban, they use an unspecified mixture of groundwater
and surface water to service about 70 percent of the state’s water
consumption needs.  Each is vested with its own authority to collect
revenues, such as user fees or assessment district mechanisms.  Some of
the larger ones have bonding authority, which they use to invest in large
infrastructure projects.  Other districts have formed joint powers
agreements to gain similar standing.  In general, however, the state’s debt
capacity dwarfs that of the districts.
In a state where two-thirds of the water supply sits in the north and
two-thirds of demand is created in the south, enormous bond capacity is
required to finance water projects.  For decades, the Department of
Water Resources has built dams and aqueducts (known today as the State
Water Project) and billed those projects to an amalgam of 29 water
districts with which it has a contract.  Politicians granted the Department
of Water Resources this authority at a time when the scale, scope, and
timing of these water projects were thought to be critical to the overall
economic growth of the state.  In particular, they wanted the State Water
Project to be free from the uncertainty created by political wrangling in
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the legislature.  With the passage of the Burns-Porter Act in 1960, the
Department of Water Resources was awarded a continuous annual
appropriation through the state budget that covers planning and
administrative costs among others.  In contrast, the primary funding
source of other infrastructure development has been contractor-
supported revenue bonds (California DWR, 1997, p. 18).
The Strategic Business Plan, a product of the Wilson administration,
now guides the department’s responsibilities, including the State Water
Project.  The department uses the Strategic Business Plan to set priorities
for development options outlined every five years in the State Water
Plan, which has been mandated since 1956.  That plan uses demand
projections from local agencies, DOF population projections, and other
tools to evaluate these options.  The department advances its preferred
options to feasibility studies, which it then presents to the legislature.
With the exception of the State Water Project, all of the department’s
responsibilities (such as flood control) are subject to the SAM and require
regular COBCPs.
The Department of Water Resources has undergone cultural change
in recent years.  A State Water Project manager summarized the attitude
of the director in the 1960s and 1970s as follows: “If we want it, we can
build it.  Here’s our decision.  If you don’t like it, tough.”  The new
attitude is about fitting into a larger environmental framework in an
atmosphere of cooperation.
Although Caltrans’s history, decisionmaking processes, and financial
mechanisms evolved quite differently from those of the Department of
Water Resources, both were granted autonomy from the SAM at about
the same time.  In a series of laws and constitutional amendments dating
back to 1923, the Department of Highways was granted continuous
annual appropriations until the mid-1970s.  These appropriations were
for planning, designing, developing, and maintaining the state’s
highways.  Like the State Water Project, this task was monumental in
scope and considered by politicians of the time to be of critical
importance to the overall economic health of the state.  In the 1950s and
1960s, Caltrans was known as the California Division of Highways, and
the California Transportation Commission (CTC) was known as the
State Highway Commission.  Caltrans and the CTC do not participate
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in California’s budgeting process for capital outlay, as they use the State
Transportation Improvement Plan (STIP) and the State Highway
Operations and Programming Plan (SHOPP) instead.  Since the 1970s,
however, all funding has been subject to the annual appropriations
process.
A total of 43 regional transportation agencies participate in the
state’s highway planning process.  The CTC works with these regional
agencies and Caltrans to prepare long-range, multi-modal assessments of
transportation needs.  These include the 1999 10-year assessment, four-
year cycles of funding estimates, and two-year cycles of actual building
and maintenance programs (STIP, SHOPP, and RTIP—the Regional
Transportation Improvement Plans).  Caltrans uses these various
projections to prepare its part of the governor’s budget.  The state senate
and assembly each have transportation committees.  The legislature has
developed a standing rule to appropriate transportation projects by
program categories rather than at the line item level.  In this sense,
Caltrans is unique among state agencies in terms of capital budgeting.
Like the Department of Water Resources, Caltrans is undergoing a
shift in organizational culture.  Along with the CTC, it is now required
to plan for other transportation modes, including those traditionally left
to the private sector, such as freight transport.  Regional and local entities
are also playing a larger role.  Seventy-five percent of the State
Transportation Improvement Plan funding now goes to regional
transportation agencies.  It would take considerable political momentum
to grant the same autonomy today to any other agency for any other
purpose.
UC and CSU Streamline Their Processes
The University of California and California State University systems
have also obtained some autonomy from the state’s capital outlay process.
Like the Department of Water Resources and Caltrans, both systems
have alternative sources of funding, such as grants and enrollment fees,
which pay for the design and construction of many types of facilities.
The most interesting aspect of UC and CSU’s distance from the SAM,
however, involves the extent to which those systems handle certain
elements of the budgeting and project development processes in-house.
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In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the UC system experienced
budget reductions of about 20 percent in real dollars.  The process was
repeated in the late 1970s and early 1980s.  In the early 1990s, state
funding decreased so much that cost-of-living increases were curtailed,
salaries were temporarily cut, and student fees were raised as much as 125
percent.  During these times of low funding, enrollment in the UC
system did not decrease.
In response to these trying times, the UC system has chosen to shift
much of the decisionmaking and financial risk from the Office of the
President to the nine campuses.  Equipped with planning and funding
guidelines from the Office of the President, each campus prepares an
annual five-year plan and defines its capital outlay requests.  The Office
of the President then integrates these requests and presents the result to
the state through the SAM.  The larger CSU system operates in a more
centralized fashion but produces similar documentation.  The 22
campuses write their own proposals and five-year plans but the funding
priorities are set and administered centrally.  CSU also experienced
budget cuts between the 1970s and the early 1990s.  Its enrollment
decreased significantly, however, leaving campuses with excess capacity.
The research demands and academic programs also created a different set
of infrastructure needs.  For example, the buildings are typically but not
always less complex.  In general, their situation was not as challenging as
the one faced by the UC system.
Although their internal processes differ remarkably, both UC and
CSU have enjoyed a reputation for completing projects as designed, on
time, and within budget.  Participants in this study praised both systems
above all other departments for their approach to infrastructure planning
and development.  Some observers estimate that the two organizations
cut years off the time needed to complete buildings, including more than
10 months in the design phase alone.  As a result of this record, both
have received permission to handle certain elements of the budgeting and
project development processes in-house.  Unlike other state departments,
they may apply any cost savings they realize to augment other projects.
They also have permission to select projects for streamlined processing
through the SAM in lump-sum fashion, collecting appropriations for
preliminary plans, working drawings, and construction drawings all at
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once.  They also have the authority to handle project cost increases up to
10 percent internally without any augmentation from the legislature.
They return to the legislature only in the rare case that they need an
augmentation of more than 20 percent of the total project cost.  When
these requests do occur, representatives of both systems present their own
case to the legislature without the backing of the Department of Finance.
Because permission to streamline projects is a powerful incentive to
complete them on time and within budget, both organizations work
diligently to cover costs and adjust their design and construction to avoid
returning to the legislature for additional funds.
New Prisons and Other Exceptions from the
Legislature
The Department of Corrections owns approximately 20 percent of
the state’s building space.  One of the largest prison systems in the world,
it depends entirely on capital outlay funding from the state.  About 300
staff members work in the capital planning and construction division
alone.
Prisons are typically located in small rural communities that benefit
from the economic stability brought by state employment.  They are self-
sufficient to the point of including wastewater supply and treatment
facilities.  Politically, they are easier to repair than to plan, finance, and
construct, as each prison takes care of its own maintenance.  To one
planner, capital planning for the Department of Corrections involves,
“talking to a lot of others.”  The department prepares two facilities
master plans each year.  One is submitted to the Department of Finance
as required by the SAM.  This plan includes all capital outlay projects
except new prisons.  In 1983, the Department of Corrections was
granted the authority to replace the role of the Department of General
Services in the capital outlay process for new prisons.  After the prison
bond fund was created in 1990, the department began to prepare
separate master plans specifically for new prisons.  Most of the planning
done in the department today grew with this program.
New prisons do not have to go through the normal capital budgeting
process.  The master plan for new prisons reflects policy guidance from
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the governor and elaborate projections for anticipated populations to
service.  Such projects often enter the appropriations process via the
legislature and receive detailed scrutiny from the Department of Finance
and the governor.
In fact, all kinds of projects may be introduced through the
legislature with comparatively little participation from the DOF.  In this
way, the legislature acts as an escape valve from the annual budgeting
process.  Legislators can craft statutes that call for appropriations for
developments of practically any type, to be designed or delivered with as
much guidance or control in the process as the legislature and governor
see fit.  Often the administration or line departments suggest these
projects, but they may also emerge directly from the legislators
themselves.  This method can be used by anyone who does not want to
go through the budget process where the project may receive more review
and be considered along with other competing projects.  It may also be
used to test new processes for project delivery or other types of policy
shifts, such as the current program for “design-build” contracting, which
includes the high-profile Capitol Area East End Project in Sacramento.
The Pieces as They Fit Together
The Department of Finance administers a project-by-project
budgeting process for capital outlay as prescribed in the SAM.  Financing
drives the system.  The availability of funds constrains decisions
regarding infrastructure priorities and even determines needs assessments.
The capital outlay budget gives us a picture of the state’s infrastructure,
even if only an annual snapshot.  Together, these elements constitute the
“big picture” of infrastructure decisionmaking in California.
The process prescribed by the SAM is detailed and rigorous,
complicated, and time-consuming.  Not everyone is required to play by
its rules, however.  Certain players with financial muscle opt out, such as
the DWR, Caltrans, UC, and CSU.  The Department of Corrections is
now attached to heightened political concerns and has also found ways to
opt out.  These players and their actions define the boundaries of the
“big picture” for infrastructure decisionmaking in California.  By
operating outside the box, they define its boundaries.
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Many call the budget process for capital outlay a “stop and start”
process.  Projects adhering to the SAM can easily take 30 to 40 months
to go through the design phase.  Those that would normally take two to
three years to implement can take five to seven years or more.  Design
firms under contract with various departments engaged with the SAM
have to go through many iterations of design, periodically stopping for
months to wait for legislative review.  If changes are made and deadlines
missed for COBCP submittal, the waiting period before appropriations
could be as long as two years.
In reality, however, the private sector cannot afford to wait.  Key
personnel move on to other work, and it becomes harder to track
changes and retain consistent institutional memory for important project
details.  This is a classic case of procedural inefficiency.  In terms of time,
contracting fees, and staff resources, the transaction costs for a building
or any other single piece of infrastructure are extraordinarily high,
though not always easy to quantify.  The public sector should also be
concerned.  As one capital manager noted, “Inflation waits for no one.”
The Department of Water Resources and Caltrans work around the
SAM because they have continuous appropriations or outside sources of
revenue.  UC and CSU still work through the SAM, but they have
negotiated the fastest possible way to do so, leveraging their own user fees
and political reputation in the process.  Because projects deemed overly
sensitive are held tightly by the legislature, their association with the
SAM is truncated.  Financing through the state treasurer’s office to assist
private and nonprofit infrastructure developers has neither a practical
relation to the SAM nor explicit systems for prioritization.
The more sophisticated and effective long-term planning and
development efforts occur at the margins of the SAM or completely
outside it.  Caltrans looks 10 years ahead and the Department of Water
Resources provides detailed analyses and project ranking five years into
the future.  UC takes a more organic and decentralized approach, but
like CSU, plans with long-term programmatic goals in mind.  Each of
these departments was granted its degree of autonomy from the budget
process in a significantly different way.  Freedom from formal controls,
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however, is never complete freedom from the political process.
Ultimately the governor and legislature have the constitutional
responsibility to ensure that the public interest is upheld.
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4. Planning
Over the next 20 years, California’s population is expected to grow
by 12 million, or more than 35 percent.1  To serve that population, the
sum of various estimates indicates that the state will need to spend $200
billion on infrastructure at the state level.2  This figure does not account
for inflation, disasters, new technologies, and other inevitable
contingencies.  Nor does it reflect the historical fact that California’s
actual population has always exceeded forecasts and projections.
Managing these massive investments will require exceptional foresight
and planning.  In particular, such planning must take a long-term and
comprehensive view of future needs and demands; analyze options to
provide for them; assess the impacts, costs, and benefits of the options;
suggest preferred alternatives; and array mechanisms to implement them.
The ideal process also accounts for the varied interests in a political
process, constant changes in conditions, and numerous other constraints
that shape options and outcomes.  How does California’s infrastructure
planning stand up to this ideal?
Agencies Plan, Not the Administration
In California, infrastructure planning is the province of the executive
branch generally, and of state agencies and departments specifically.
Before the recent passage of AB 1473, the legislative branch enacted
statutes that require infrastructure planning by the agencies but not by
the administration itself.3  The legislature oversees the executive branch
____________ 
1Angelides (1999).
2California Department of Finance (1999a); California Transportation Commission
(1999); and the preliminary estimates for health facilities, court systems, high-speed rail,
and large-scale water projects.
3As of this writing, there were two competing bills in the legislature to redress this
void: SB 915 (Peace et al.) and AB 636 (Migden et al.) plus a proposed constitutional
amendment: SCA 9 (Peace and McPherson).
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and adopts the administration’s budget.  The judiciary also provides
planning mandates in its rulings and interpretations of statutory law.  For
example, the Racanelli decision stated that the State Water Resources
Control Board needed to provide reasonable protection of beneficial uses
of Delta and San Francisco Bay waters, and that it needed to separate
water quality planning from water rights activities (United States v. State
Water Resources Control Board, 182 Cal. App. 3rd 82, 1986).
Statutes governing capital planning provide for department-wide
plans and plans for specific program areas.  Most functional areas in state
government, such as transportation, corrections, water, and others, have
specific statutes guiding their planning.  With the exception of provisions
that require a statewide Environmental Goals and Policy Report—unused
for over 20 years—statewide planning is not provided for in the
California Code.  Thus, infrastructure planning is done by the agencies
and departments through broad strategic plans, such as the Department
of Water Resources 1997 Strategic Business Plan, and specific program
or functional plans, such as the Department of Water Resources 1998
State Water Plan.  Most larger and mid-size agencies do their own
facilities planning, with the Department of General Services providing
project management assistance and the Department of Finance providing
capital budgeting assistance.  The Department of General Services
performs facilities planning for smaller departments that have limited
staff and expertise.  Overall, our investigation has revealed that the level
of sophistication and detail regarding infrastructure planning varies
widely from department to department.
Infrastructure planning for programs by individual departments
contrasts with infrastructure budgeting, which is done across-the-board
by the Department of Finance for the administration.  The executive
branch submits a unified budget to the legislature for adoption.
Individual program planning by departments also contrasts with across-
the-board financing activities, such as bond funds administered by the
treasurer, the Pooled Money Investment Board, and the Public Works
Board.
Until AB 1473, no California statute provided for a statewide
infrastructure plan or strategy.  This fact has been noted in every major
report on the status of California’s infrastructure released in the last two
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decades.  California Code sections 65025 et seq. establish the Governor’s
Office of Planning and Research and direct it to develop “state land use
policies, coordinating planning of all state agencies, and assisting and
monitoring local and regional planning” (§ 65035, emphasis added).
The prime vehicle for these activities is the state Environmental Goals and
Policy Report.  Its purpose is to “serve as a basis for judgments about the
design, location, and priority of major public programs, capital projects,
and other actions, including the allocation of state resources . . . through
the budget process” (§ 65047).  This report, which was required to be
revised and submitted to the legislature every four years, was prepared
and adopted only once, in 1978, with the title An Urban Strategy for
California (Executive Order B-41-78).
The state planning statute makes two links to the Department of
Finance and the state budget.  It states “the necessity of allocating fiscal
and other resources of the state among competing programs and needs
requires integration of the planning and executive budget functions within
state government” (§ 65032, emphasis added).  The law also states that
the Office of Planning and Research shall “assist the Department of
Finance in preparing, as part of the annual state budget, an integrated
program of priority actions to implement state functional plans” (§
65040).  Yet the law stops short of specifying that the Environmental
Goals and Policy Report be used to make these links.
These provisions for state planning have not been used since the first
and only Goals Report of 1978.  Tellingly, recent reports on California’s
infrastructure have not mentioned the Office of Planning and Research’s
statutory roles or the Environmental Goals and Policy Report (California
Business Roundtable, 1998; Legislative Analyst’s Office, 1998a;
Angelides, 1999; Commission on Building for the 21st Century, 1999a,
1999b).  The Constitution Revision Commission mentioned a four-year
strategic plan prepared by the administration for statewide policy
(California Constitution Revision Commission, 1996).  Its strategy
included a capital facilities and financing plan.
In contrast, state law applicable to the Department of Finance
regarding infrastructure is more explicit and revealing.  The article
governing “Capital and Infrastructure Project Planning” stipulates that
the Director of Finance shall prepare a report for the “financing of major
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capital outlay projects and infrastructure projects” (§ 13100, emphasis
added).  The stipulation is satisfied by the annual Capital Outlay and
Infrastructure Report, which is required to “be used to plan for the state’s
long term financing needs in a manner which will protect the financial
integrity of the state.”  The law does not mention any links to land use,
the economy, or the growth of the state.  Nor does it specify performance
criteria that measure the effectiveness of capital investments.  The Capital
Outlay and Infrastructure Report is used in conjunction with the
treasurer’s annual Debt Affordability Report for the state’s investment
financing, not planning.  As the titles of these two reports suggest, the
state’s eye is on its credit rating, not the purposes for which infrastructure
investments are made.  Neither report guides the provision of
infrastructure or its location, amount, type, design, construction, use, or
cost.  Likewise, neither guides agency and departmental infrastructure
planning except to articulate resource constraints on capital programs.
In response to the state’s planning processes, many official
publications and commissions, not to mention nearly all of those
interviewed for this research, have stated that California is relatively
strong on project planning by individual state agencies and weak on
statewide planning and strategy by the administration.
Types of Plans
Within the array of infrastructure planning activities in the state, we
identify below five major categories.
Capital Outlay and Infrastructure Report
Author:  Department of Finance
Time horizon: One-year capital budget
Five-year capital program
Basis: State departments submit list of capital projects
and Capital Outlay Budget Change Proposals
Period: Prepared annually
Capitalized Assets Plan
Author:  State departments
Time horizon: Five years
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Basis: Capital projects
Period: Prepared annually, compiled by the 
Department of Finance into the Capital Outlay
and Infrastructure Report
Capital Outlay Survey Responses
Author: State departments, tabulated by the 
Department of Finance, included as part of the
Capital Outlay and Infrastructure Report
Time horizon: Ten years




Time horizon: Varies from five to 20 years4
Basis: Varies, depending on governing statutes and 
state and federal policies and procedures
Period: Varies from annual to unspecified
Strategic (Business) Plans
Author: State departments
Time horizon: Varies, three or more years5
Basis: Sound business practices
Period: Prepared every three to five years, upon the 
expiration of the prior strategic plan
____________ 
4Time horizons vary among and within departments, depending on the governing
statutes.  For example, the California Transportation Commission was required by law to
prepare a 10-year comprehensive needs assessment.  The federal Clean Water Act
mandates that a 20-year Needs Survey for wastewater, combined sewer overflow, storm
water, and other water quality treatment infrastructure be prepared every two years.
5Strategic plans are medium-term, action-oriented business plans instituted in the
Wilson administration.  For example, the Department of Water Resources published its
first Strategic Business Plan in 1994, and its second in 1997.  The University of
California’s “strategic plan” is in the form of a governor-legislature-board of regents
compact, the first of which was enacted in 1995 for a four-year period.
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Note that the first and third documents listed are more properly
reports, not plans.
Two types of plans are used in capital planning.  One is a short-term,
project-based, budgetary plan used by departments, the administration,
and the legislature in the capital outlay budget process.  The other is a
medium- to long-term, program-based plan used by departments to
guide their operations.  According to evidence gathered during our
research, departmental planning is more common, sophisticated, and
frequently used than ever before.
Short-term budgetary plans are established according to the detailed
SAM requirements issued by the Department of Finance.  Longer-term
plans are prepared according to attending professional traditions and in
compliance with state and federal laws.  Some agencies prepare only five-
year Capitalized Assets Plans and Strategic Plans.  Each year, departments
and agencies prepare and submit a five-year capital plan as part of their
capital outlay budget package.  Most departments also prepare strategic
plans.  Introduced by a Wilson administration Executive Order in the
mid-1990s, strategic business plans are new to state government and still
in an experimental phase.  Departments that prepare them are
experiencing a steep learning curve.
Despite requirements to prepare five-year plans and 10-year surveys,
the overwhelming emphasis is on the annual capital outlay budget,
particularly the COBCPs, which are planning and budgetary documents
that detail particulars for capital projects.  COBCPs must support a
department’s strategic plan, and “all departments within the
Administration (which excludes constitutional officers, constitutionally
created boards and commissions, and the higher education segment)
must have a strategic plan approved by the Governor’s Office before the
DOF will consider a COBCP” (California Department of Finance,
1999b,  §§ 6812, 6816).  Although departments may use their strategic
plans for their own purposes, in practice the use of strategic plans in the
budget process appears to be a perfunctory check.  As one budget staff
member commented, “It’s been so long since I’ve looked at them.  I can’t
even remember.”
The five-year Capitalized Assets Plan is designed to identify projects,
set priorities among them, and relate the department’s annual capital
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outlay program to its strategic plan.  Departments are to base these plans
on “statistics and projections, and changes in statute driving program
needs,” and to “discuss . . . growth trends, changing methods or locations
of service delivery, and new service requirements” (California
Department of Finance, 1999b, § 6820).  Many agencies with less-
developed capital planning programs provide few data beyond the budget
year.  This is partly because of the SAM, which prescribes a constrained
set of factors to consider in the out-years.  Some agencies that have well-
developed planning programs, such as Caltrans, Corrections, Water
Resources, and higher education, provide more robust data.
We found that the strength of the linkages among agencies’ policies,
plans, programs, needs, and budgets varied widely.  A high degree of
accountability, and therefore attention, is placed on budget-year capital
expenditures at the expense of medium- and long-term plans.  No link is
required between a department’s five-year Capitalized Assets Plan and its
strategic plan.  No link is required between a department’s 10-year
capital survey responses and its strategic plan.  Moreover, the strategic
plan is not required to be submitted to the Department of Finance in the
capital budget process.  This state of affairs also could be inferred from
the pages in the SAM’s sections on capitalized assets.  Only six pages are
devoted to planning, whereas 87 are dedicated to budgeting, project
administration, and financing.  According to one long-time public
executive, the system favors “short-term budget balancing, not long-term
asset management.”
Project Orientation
“To define infrastructure as projects tends to
 limit what is infrastructure.”
Dale Claypoole, Deputy Director,
State Water Resources Control Board
Another feature of California’s infrastructure planning is its project
orientation.  For the most part, agencies prepare plans for individual
capital projects, such as prisons, schools, bridges, hospitals, or buildings.
Department-wide plans tend to aggregate individual capital project
proposals into an overall “plan.”  Rarely do state agencies prepare
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infrastructure plans for functional programs, such as wastewater
treatment.  Instead, the Departments of Water Resources and Health
Services calculate the number of projects that can be built based on the
allocation of federal Clean Water Act funds to the State Safe Drinking
Water Revolving Fund.  Caltrans explicitly operates in this fashion,
basing its building program on gas tax revenues and federal grants.  This
formula of back-calculating the number of projects that can be built from
available funds typifies the “needs” assessment process.  Delimiting need
by identified funding forms the foundation of infrastructure planning in
California.
An exception to project-based planning is K–12 public school
planning by the Department of Education.  The department’s
enrollment projections are based on Department of Finance
demographic projections.  Future enrollments are allocated to classroom
space based on the state’s policy for teacher-student ratio and the
district’s policy for multi-track year-round teaching.  The Department of
Education uses as close to a needs-driven assessment formula as any state
agency.  Even so, school facilities managers acknowledge that it is not a
pure needs-driven system.  The very definition of need changes over
time, depending on local demand for new technologies, or more
emphasis on science and math, or more emphasis on arts and sports, or
magnet and charter schools, and so on.  As with other types of
infrastructure, older algorithms for determining facilities needs in
education no longer apply.  Greater parent, student, and community
involvement; more partnerships with private and nonprofit entities; and
shifting demands placed on schools and their graduates have changed
public attitudes about what kinds of educational facilities are necessary.
The emphasis on projects is due to four main factors.  One is the
nature of the state’s capital budgeting process, which is controlled by the
Department of Finance.  Focusing on the current budget year, it funds
projects under construction or scheduled to begin construction.  Another
is the decentralized structure of state agencies, which solicit capital
project requests from subordinate divisions, branches, field offices, and
other non-headquarters units.  Small units tend to think in terms of
individual projects rather than statewide programs.  A third factor
explaining the project basis for infrastructure planning is inherent in the
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structure and operations of state government.  In the absence of any
broad growth or infrastructure policy, strategy, or plan, and in the
absence of programmatic categories driving infrastructure planning, the
legislature often gets involved in the minutiae of project financing and
approval.  Thus, the legislature also falls into the project trap.  Finally,
the political nature of the current capital budget process favors specific
projects that legislators can win for their constituents.  The political
opportunity to champion a specific project in a legislator’s district leads
to earmarked funds: classic pork barrel, according to one long-time
participant.  Capital Outlay Budget Change Proposals have state
senatorial, assembly, and congressional districts listed at the top of the
first page.  The project system is in stark contrast to a programmatic
approach.  One example of a program-based bond was the $2 billion
Seismic Retrofit Bond of 1996, which is widely regarded as a successful
capital program.  It gave the legislature a chance to engage in its classic
oversight  (as opposed to pork barrel) capacity.
Project-based infrastructure planning has its strengths and
weaknesses.  Three weaknesses were mentioned in virtually every
interview we conducted.  First, the project system is “too political.”  Here
we note that politics is not limited to the legislature.  Second, it takes too
long for a project to get built.  Costs increase unnecessarily and needs
change before the project is up and running.  Third, individual projects
are isolated from a larger strategic vision for the state.  A state strategy
would guide investments to where they are needed most, ensuring a
better return per dollar invested.  Another weakness is that project
planning has, in some cases, favored large or rich local jurisdictions.  In
the competition for projects, jurisdictions that can afford to prepare
persuasive applications and conduct persuasive lobbying are more likely
to succeed.
The project basis for capital planning also has its benefits.  The
COBCP process is elaborate, with a high degree of accountability for
funding new projects.  Projects are coordinated and reviewed by project
management and budgeting agencies, notably Finance, General Services,
the Public Works Board, the Legislative Analyst’s Office, and legislative
committees.  The process also promotes a high degree of specificity, so
the state knows exactly what it is paying for.  Finally, it provides tight
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cost control as a result of close, multi-phase review of project
development.  Cost control is somewhat illusory, however, as apparent
savings gained in the bid process are lost in the augmentation process.
(Projects are augmented up to 20 percent without reauthorization by the
legislature.)  Some agencies, such as higher education, make an effort not
to augment and make augmentation the exception rather than the rule.
A defining characteristic of capital planning and budgeting in
California is that detailed project review and budgeting substitute almost
completely for capital planning at the administration level.  Large
agencies with huge capital budgets plan, but they do so with little formal
guidance from the administration.
Decentralization and Devolution, Fragmentation,
and Coordination
Infrastructure planning mirrors two related trends in California
government.  The first is decentralization and devolution, the other
coordination.  By decentralization, we mean a dispersal of authority at
the same level of government; by devolution, we mean a shift to a lower,
smaller level of government.  Here we analyze how these trends have
been playing out in the administration, particularly the Department of
Finance and in the state agencies.
Among state agencies, the evidence for decentralization and
devolution includes the following:
• Senate Bill 45 of 1998, which allocated 75 percent of
transportation funds for new capital projects to Regional
Transportation Planning Agencies after overhead and SHOPP
(maintenance) funds have been deducted.
• The Lanterman Act of 1969, which authorized the transfer of
$1.1 billion annually (in current dollars) to nonprofit Regional
Centers for developmental services.
• The Coffelt Settlement, which directed the Department of
Developmental Services to provide substantially increased
support for community services.
• The Department of Water Resources, which passes federal flood
control funds to over 2,000 local flood control districts.
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• The California State University partly decentralized its capital
planning to the campuses, each of which prepares a campus
master plan.  The CSU system sets capital priorities for the
current (in-year) capital budget.
• The University of California, which decentralized its capital
planning to the campuses, each of which prepares a Long Range
Development Plan.
• The Department of Health Services and the Department of
Water Resources, which administer the federally funded State
Safe Drinking Water Revolving Fund, providing capital funds to
approximately 1,800 municipal water districts.
• The Department of Education and the State Allocation Board,
which administer funds for the capital programs for 1,000 local
school districts.
• The Department of General Services, which prepares Area Plans
for 12 regions, and combines them into the Statewide Facilities
Plan.
The case of flood control shows not only decentralization but
devolution and fragmentation as well.  The remedy to these combined
centrifugal institutional forces is coordination.  Yet coordination has its
costs, as amply demonstrated by the management of flood control
facilities.  Flood control in California involves 9 federal agencies, 10 state
agencies, and 2,000 local flood control agencies.6  The federal
government passes capital funds for flood control through the
Department of Water Resources to local districts.  Federal devolution of
power (money to build facilities) and authority (program criteria) to the
states is repeated by the State of California, which devolves power and
some authority directly to local districts without a regional intermediary.
____________ 
6Federal agencies are Army Corps of Engineers, Federal Emergency Management
Administration, Bureau of Reclamation, Fish and Wildlife Service, National Marine
Fisheries Service, Geological Survey, Environmental Protection Agency, Small Business
Administration, and the Department of Housing and Urban Development.  State
agencies are Reclamation Board, Department of Water Resources, California Water
Commission, State Water Resources Control Board, Department of Fish and Game,
State Lands Commission, CALFED, Office of Emergency Services, Department of
Housing and Community Development, and the Department of Real Estate.
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Fragmentation occurs throughout the system, a by-product of
institutional design as well as limitations in oversight.  The staff available
to review local programs limits oversight.  Fragmentation is particularly
in evidence among the local flood control districts.  There are 14 types of
local districts, spanning public, private, and quasi-public firms of
incorporation.  Each has its own style and constitution, which
contributes to system fragmentation.7  Flood control makes clear how
highly articulated the institutional structure of public works can be.  In
the case of flood control, decentralization and devolution carried with
them the costs of fragmentation, mainly in the form of increased
transaction costs, as more coordination became paramount.
As capital facilities planning has become more open to participation
by the public, special interests, and other jurisdictions, planning has
taken more time and money.  The advantage, at least in theory, is that
plans have become more informed, more balanced, and less politically
burdensome for politicians to the extent that they adjudicate interests in
the planning process.  In practice, recalcitrant interests have taken the
proceedings to court or steered the process behind closed doors.  An
example of this new reality has been planning in the San Francisco Bay
and San Joaquin Delta, which has evolved in the 1990s to be known as
CALFED.  Like other complex, multi-year collaborations, CALFED has
coordinated planning, pooled knowledge and resources, and shared risk.
There has been a profound change in the way water business is done
since the heyday of the State Water Project.  “If we want it, we can build
it” summed up the attitude in the 1960s and 1970s.  Even though the
Department of Water Resources enjoys the same bonding authority and
legislative framework now as then, it has become more cautious and
collaborative.  In effect, the state realized it could not go it alone.
Flood control and CALFED bring to light institutional intricacies
that constrain the planning and building of infrastructure throughout the
____________ 
7The 14 types of local flood control districts authorized by legislation are Water
Replenishment Districts, Water Storage Districts, Community Service Districts, Resource
Conservation Districts, Municipal Water Districts, Water Conservation Districts, Water
Districts, Irrigation Districts, County Drainage Districts, Reclamation Districts, Levee
Districts, Special Acts County Districts, Cities, and Counties (California Department of
Finance, 1997).
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state.  Local agencies are gaining more power and more freedom to set
their own agendas.  State agencies build less but gain more oversight.  In
the face of decentralization, devolution, and fragmentation, local and
state agencies require more information, more planning, and more
coordination to execute capital programs.  This shift has led to
skyrocketing transaction costs and costly dysfunctions as the multitude of
jurisdictions adapt to a more complex institutional scenario.  Mounting
needs coupled with scarce resources compound this complexity.
These new realities are readily apparent, but other less evident
changes may be more insidious.  Local agencies tend to have fewer
resources than the state to reduce the growing gap between the rich and
the poor.  In particular, localities are less likely to absorb the soft costs of
increased planning, coordination, and local resistance unless supported
by state or other assistance.  As a result, state goals have begun to take a
back seat to local wishes unless accompanied by incentives or sanctions.
These trends signal serious shifts in the power landscapes of California’s
infrastructure.  As localities have more money to build, they will
continue to gain power.
The general response to decentralization, devolution, and
fragmentation has been to coordinate processes, information,
institutional arrangements, and resources.  Coordination is a new mantra
and trades under names such as partnership and collaboration.  It has
been going on for generations between state prisons and county jails and
between the federal Bureau of Reclamation and the Department of
Water Resources.  New initiatives often require it as well.  For example,
the sexually violent predator programs involve a good deal of
coordination between the Departments of Corrections and Health
Services, the courts, legislature, and local entities.  Our interviews for this
study indicated that coordination has become indispensable, as lines of
authority, responsibility, and accountability are redrawn regularly.
The best-documented lack of coordination in infrastructure planning
is between the administration and the state’s agencies.  There have been
no instruments to codify an overall state policy and no institutional
structures to effectuate it.  The only coordination among agencies at the
state level has been for state capital budgeting and capital facilities project
management.  These are important but limited.  Capital budgeting is
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short-term, and project management is a micro-management tool
compared to the breadth of state policy.  Even in these two areas, the
state struggles to cope with the vast amount of information needed to
perform its mandates.
Project Planning Coordination
The Department of General Services manages the state’s real
property and maintains the Statewide Property Inventory, a centralized
real estate management information system.  The system includes a
comprehensive inventory of all leased facilities managed by the
department and all state property except for Caltrans’s roadways and
rights of way as well as the State Lands Commission’s listings for school
lands.  The Statewide Property Inventory is used by the Department of
General Services to help manage the state’s real estate assets and to
respond to queries by others.  It is not used by the Department of
Finance to manage capital facilities or to coordinate information or
processes.
The Department of General Services controls capital project
management with the exception of facilities exempt by legislation, which
include highways, prisons, airports, water projects, and universities.
Thus, the department manages buildings rather than public works.  Its
project management software was developed over the years through use
and refinement.  Another project management system is being developed
by the Department of Finance to track the scope, cost, and schedule of
capital projects.  It is tentatively called the Capital Outlay Project
Tracking System (COPTS) and is supposed to be linked to the state
capital budget.  Preliminary discussions with the Department of General
Services regarding coordination have begun.  It is premature to assess
what degree of integration, if any, there will be between their project
management database systems.  For now, agencies have their own project
management methods.  For example, Caltrans uses the State
Transportation Improvement Plan and the State Highway Operations
and Protection Plan to manage its assets.
Efforts to link all the statewide capital assets database management
systems (including the Statewide Property Inventory, the Statewide
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Facilities Plans, the General Services Project Management System, the
Capital Outlay Project Tracking System, Capital Outlay Budget Change
Requests, and the Capital Outlay and Infrastructure Report) are at the
discussion stage only.  Some of these components are organized in
databases; others are disparate data, to be assembled as required.  The
extensive overlap and duplication among these databases leave ample
opportunities for streamlining.  Participants believe that full integration
will take years.  An example of a database coordination effort in progress
for decades is the consolidation of demographic forecasting in the
Department of Finance.  State agencies that use the DOF’s projections in
their own capital planning indicate that they are better overall than what
existed before the centralization of demographic forecasting.  They
further indicate that having uniform projections enhances state capital
budgeting efforts and agencies’ capital planning processes.
We found that the need for increased coordination has risen
markedly because of the increasing complexity, decentralization,
devolution, and fragmentation within the institutions that manage
infrastructure.  That need is most apparent in the weak ties between
long-term policy and planning and short-term budgets and projects.
Current coordination efforts at the state level are mostly spearheaded by
the Department of General Services (for project management) and the
Department of Finance (for project budgeting).
Needs Assessments
“There is always more need than funding, by far.”
Diane van Maren
Associate Secretary,
Health and Human Services
The above quote is considered a truism within state government.
Nearly every person interviewed gave a variation on Secretary van
Maren’s response.  Our historical review indicates that needs-funding
gaps have been identified in times of economic bust as well as boom.  Yet
recent reports seem to bear out the anecdotal evidence.  Depending on
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the assessor and the relevant time frame, these reports show gaps in
funding amounting to billions of dollars.8
This section does not include a new calculation of need or an
exhaustive analysis of other such calculations.  Rather, it asks the broader
questions of how need numbers are derived:  Who conducts the
assessment?  For what purpose?  How are needs calculated?  What
motivates the methodology?  We examined a range of factors that shape
need determinations:  policy, headlines, and politics along with
professional standards, growth projections, and service deficits.  We also
analyzed how tradeoffs were made in needs assessments, including
decisions to build new facilities or repair existing ones; to predict needs
based on actual user demand or future growth multiplied by needs
standards per capita; and to react to current problems or to anticipate
new ones.  Our results indicate that needs assessments were based on a
wide range of disparate factors; that needs data were biased in
unpredictable ways; and that assessment methods were inconsistent
across agencies.  The resulting inconsistency and unpredictability have
led to what some have called “beauty contest” prioritization.
Sketchy Data
Needs data tend to be aggregated from individual project data as
they move up the bureaucratic chain.  Examples include data gathered by
the Department of Corrections, the Department of Water Resources,
and the State Water Resources Control Board for sewage treatment.  For
the most part, errors accumulate and are not excised as they go up the
ladder.  Capital Outlay Budget Change Proposals, the most common
documents used to specify needs, are used to prepare the annual Capital
Outlay and Infrastructure Report. These proposals are sometimes based on
old information or assessment criteria.  The Capital Outlay and
____________ 
8California Department of Finance (1999a) estimated an unfunded balance of $6.4
billion over 10 years.  The California Business Roundtable (1998) calculated an
unfunded balance of $6.6 billion over the next 10 years.  The California Transportation
Commission (1999) estimated needs ranging between $62 billion and $73 billion over
the next 10 years, depending on level of service, not including interregional
improvements in urban areas.  These reports did not include big ticket items such as the
Peripheral Canal, CALFED, the State Water Project, high-speed rail, or a ferry system for
the Bay area.
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Infrastructure Report is itself incomplete, as it excludes possible projects
(such as high-speed rail) and recurring needs from the State Water
Project, the State Transportation Improvement Plan, and the CALFED
water process.
Needs assessments are inconsistent and incomplete for a variety of
reasons:
• Different time horizons: five, 10, or 20 years
• Lack of sufficient resources and staff to prepare assessments
• Lack of adequate data and documentation
• Lack of attention to a documented problem, such as non-point
source pollution and combined sewer overflows before the 1990s
• Lack of a method to calculate needs, such as life-cycle
rehabilitation schedules
• New findings that change what we know, such as seismic stress
models for structural safety
• Low levels of awareness that a problem exists, such as lead paint,
asbestos, and other health and environmental concerns before
the 1960s
• No auditing of departmental data submitted for the Capital
Outlay and Infrastructure Report by the Department of Finance
We found that the most common denominator of the state’s needs
assessment information is its inconsistency.  This inconsistency is
compounded by the fact that the Department of Finance does not audit
departmental infrastructure data submitted to it in annual reports.
Faulty data have their price:  in this case, less than optimal judgments
and decisions.  Lack of consistent and enforced guidance in this area has
led some agencies to see how much they can squeeze from the budget
and appropriations processes.
Dollars Drive Needs
Some agencies, including Caltrans, the Department of Water
Resources, the State Water Resources Control Board, and the
Department of Health Services, base needs on the amount of money
available to build facilities.  Each of these agencies has a dedicated and
stable source of funding.  Other programs with predictable income, such
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as revenue and lease revenue bond payments, also let available funding
drive the “need.”  Only when foreseeable funding is lacking do agencies
project needs based on other factors.  In some instances, program and
policy needs determine infrastructure investments.  A leading example of
the latter is the Department of Education, which estimates school needs
based on enrollment projections and class size ratios.  When the
Department of Transportation decides to build freeways and bridges
during a recession, it does so more to stem the downside of the economic
cycle than to meet rational needs projections.
Other agencies blend rationally projected needs data and available
dollars to determine “need.”  An example is the State Water Resources
Control Board, which assumed this year that only half of the monies
needed to pay for water quality facilities would be available from state
and federal sources.  In this case, the board’s definition of need was
derived from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s 1996 Clean
Water Needs Survey Report to Congress.  Yet the board reported only half
of that need to the Department of Finance for inclusion in the Capital
Outlay budget because it “assumes that the demand for local assistance is
about 50 percent of the total needs as documented by the 1996 U.S.
EPA Needs Survey Report to Congress.  Annual needs are estimated by .
. . reducing the total by 50 percent to represent a reasonable demand for
state and federal funding” (State Water Resources Control Board, 1999
Capital Outlay and Infrastructure Report submission to the Department of
Finance, July 20, 1998, Table D).
React or Assess?
In many cases, infrastructure managers simply try to stay afloat.
This is especially true when they must repair damage from floods, fires,
and earthquakes.  They must also respond to mandates based on new
research, settled lawsuits, and other sources.  For example, the
Department of General Services Statewide Facilities Plan reveals that,
after lease consolidation, most state office building needs are for seismic
retrofit, PCB abatement, underground storage tank replacement, asbestos
and lead-based paint removal, and Americans with Disabilities Act
compliance.  Because resources are scarce and incentives for foresight
scant, managers often wait for these prompts, which often stem from the
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latest headlines, to become institutionalized.  For example, one official
characterized the infrastructure needs assessment process in health care as
“completely reactive.”  Health services agencies begin their assessments
with the fact that facilities are out of compliance with existing laws or
court orders.  Many state facilities have received numerous waivers to
keep their doors open for business.  Reactive needs assessment for these
facilities is a result of their low priority.
Although infrastructure managers realize that headlines do not
always indicate real need, they often feel resigned to acting when the
political moment is ripe.  They are caught between rigid methodologies
for long-term needs assessment and fluid, short-term political processes.
Their quandary is compounded by changes in markets, technology, and
other conditions, all of which tend to move faster than the legislative
process.  In response to this quandary, managers have bowed to politics
and become more opportunistic in assessing and reporting need.  In
short, these managers must strike a healthy and judicious balance
between foresight and responsiveness.  Legislative staffers are attuned to
this tension as well.  Infrastructure bills from recent sessions have stressed
flexibility and fluidity, partly because many legislators understand the
link between adequate resources and effective planning.  According to
Assistant State Treasurer Sumi Sousa, “If you had a lot more money, you
could afford to be a lot less reactive.”
Need or Demand?
Infrastructure need and demand are not identical.  For example, a
need projection for schools multiplies the projected enrollment increases
over a given period of time by the standard amount of space needed per
student.  This simplification does not reflect other factors that affect
demand, including changes in income, technology, and the availability of
alternative services.  The point is illustrated by the recent compact to
increase the number of science and engineering graduates by 40 percent.
This compact responds to the demands of a new economy rather than to
any demographic characteristic.
In the past, needs assessments based on standard parameters and user
growth projections have been the norm.  The very term “needs
assessment” is a carryover from that mode of thinking, which focused on
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common needs for sewers, water mains, roads, parks, and the like.  For
example, the State Water Resources Control Board calculates the need
for sewage treatment facilities using the U.S. EPA’s National Cost
Model, as stipulated in the Clean Water Act.  In contrast, the private
sector focuses on market demand for consumer goods and services.  An
airline, for example, adds or drops routes to accommodate changes in
consumer travel preferences.  Today, the boundary line between pure
need and pure demand is blurring as the public sector privatizes some
service delivery, assumes other functions accorded in the past to the
private sector, and forms partnerships with nonprofit and private groups.
An especially lucid example of how needs have changed and given
way to more flexible demands is the case of California state prisons in the
1990s.  After the three strikes law was passed in the early 1990s, each
Department of Corrections Capital Facilities Master Plan, which based
prison needs on the projected number of inmates, estimated that fewer
new prisons were needed.  The latest plan projected the need to be for
only one or two new prisons.9  This trend shows how political and
sentencing realities, including gains in experience with the effect of
various sentencing laws, have tempered the needs assessment process and
resulted in lower projections.  This case also shows another factor in the
needs equation—that of demand management.  In prisons today,
inmates are routinely double-bunked to halve the need for beds and save
on costs.  This practice has caused unsafe and unsanitary conditions and
overcrowding, and most corrections officials believe double-bunking not
to be sustainable over the long run.  Even so, it is the norm today and for
the foreseeable future.
Whether a need or demand approach is used, one trend common to
all agencies is the use of decentralized methods.  Projects are solicited
from as close to the actual user or customer as possible.  This approach
relies on direct user feedback and data to determine actual levels of use
rather than projections based on professional standards.  The subtle
relation between need and demand has yet to be fully exploited by
infrastructure managers and policymakers in California.  There is a need
____________ 
9California Department of Corrections (1998).
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for further research and analysis to ascertain how needs and demands
data are used and misused in infrastructure planning.
Needs Assessment Summary
“Current needs assessments are not based on a comprehensive
plan of investment, nor are they designed to achieve the
goals of ensuring sustained economic growth, environmental
 preservation, equality of opportunity, and livability”
Angelides (1999, p. 5)
The treasurer’s view of needs assessment relates infrastructure to
future goals and therefore stands in stark contrast to current practices.
These practices include deriving needs from policies and programs,
available dollars, future population projections, user demands, and a host
of external mandates.  This cacophony has led one official to observe that
no magic formula applies universally to all agencies.  Rather, each one
has devised its own methods suited to its own types of infrastructure.
Regardless of which methods are to be adopted, a set of consistent
principles for all agencies, the administration, and the legislature would
ensure a level playing field that allows for fair comparison and judgments
of priority.  Taken together, the inconsistencies and inadequacies of the
current assessment process reinforce the culture of political expediency.
Time Horizons
Time horizons currently vary from one to 20 years.  At one end of
that spectrum, 20-year assessments are disconnected from the realities of
the executive branch, in which a new administration is elected every four
years, as well as the legislative branch, which changes every two years.
They also cannot anticipate changes in lifestyles and technology.  Even
the 10-year survey elicited quotes such as “Let’s get real!” and “way out
there.”  On the other end of the spectrum, most interviewees told us that
one year is too short, calling the one-year capital budget process a
“beauty contest,” “wish list,” “laundry list,” and an “infrastructure wants
assessment.” Five years was considered to be the most realistic time
horizon in state government.  This period coincided best with political
turnover, current capital planning, the budgeting processes, and the time
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horizons of most departments’ strategic plans.  Five years is long enough
to merit valid planning and short enough to be responsive to changing
conditions. According to one veteran, five years is “as good as it will get.”
Rapid advances in technology, new immigration patterns, the
changing demands of a global society and economy, and the seesaw of
economic and political cycles make flexible assessment methods a
necessity.  In an era that compelled Sun Microsystems CEO Scott
McNealy to proclaim “new technology has the shelf life of a banana,”
state agencies struggle to balance far-sighted visions and short-term sure
bets.
Demand Management
Demand management is a relatively new tool in infrastructure
planning and needs assessment.  Agencies increasingly use demand
management to do more with less.  It has become a necessity as needs far
outstrip resources.  The aim is to reap a greater return on capital
investments by decreasing the demand for facilities and using existing
ones more intensively.  Cost savings accrue as less infrastructure is needed
to serve the existing population.  Conserving energy or shifting demand
from cars to buses and trains exemplify two approaches to demand
management.  Most agencies have become more resourceful and
inventive, finding new ways to deliver infrastructure services. Creative
partnerships, new technologies, and local initiative have been at the core
of demand management.10  The prevailing attitude has been smarter, not
more.
In the past, state infrastructure planning accommodated or
encouraged growth by building new facilities.  Now state departments
emphasize maintenance, rehabilitation, modernization, and demand
management.  Whereas the California Community College system’s
1991 plan targeted new growth almost exclusively, its new plan will
____________ 
10Local water districts work closely with the State Water Resources Control Board
to calculate demand projections.  Metropolitan Planning Organizations initiate means to
reduce travel demand, in collaboration with Caltrans.  Year-round schooling is a
prerogative of local school districts.
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emphasize technology, smart schools, the modernization of buildings and
classrooms, and distance and virtual learning.  Likewise, the State Water
Project and Peripheral Canal proposal reflected an era in which new
water projects were built to transport water over great distances.  Today’s
water planning is almost entirely devoted to demand management in one
form or another.  Caltrans has built fewer highways and directs
significant funds to intelligent transportation systems.  It also researches
and tests a range of demand management strategies, including congestion
pricing, automated bridge toll collection, “smart” cards, and multi-modal
interconnectivity of urban transportation systems.  The Department of
Corrections has instituted double-bunking out of necessity.  The
Department of Education promotes multi-track year-round schooling.
The Department of Motor Vehicles instituted mail-in car registration to
reduce the need for additional field offices.
Curiously, we did not find evidence of demand management
programs for the most rapidly growing sector of infrastructure,
telecommunications.  This sector seems to be responding to consumer
demand and providing as many options, channels, and modes as possible.
This proliferation of choices matches the usual pattern of a new
technology in its early stages.
Demand management can also be linked to performance targets, or
benchmarks for specific infrastructure services.  The goal is to ensure
optimal use of existing facilitiesIn general, performance measures related





• Greater cost savings
• More intensive use
• Fewer negative impacts
• Demand shift
Specific targets in use today include levels of service for traffic
congestion, graduation rates and college accession rates for high school
students, and pollution loads for water treatment systems.  Many
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departments do not use such targets, and those that do often employ
outdated ones.  This is evident in many health and developmental
facilities, as new research and new types of stress-induced maladies alter
our understandings of the nature of illness, wellness, and treatment.
Summary and Conclusion
Infrastructure planning decisions are based on the current political-
economic-social climate as well as on long-term needs and program goals.
They tend to reward short-term budget balancing, not long-term asset
management.  Partly because the administration lacks an infrastructure
planning culture and a legal structure by which to effectuate it, each
agency has developed its own planning practices.  For example, the
University of California culture is decentralized, collaborative, and
demand-driven.  Its calculations are based on informal, information-rich
consultations with individual campuses.  The State University and
Community College systems, while also decentralized and collaborative,
use more formalized ranking criteria and more formulaic processes.  The
Departments of Corrections and Education, which also possess
decentralized cultures, use hierarchical chains of command to manage the
planning by subordinate units.  Such disparate cultures and styles go far
in explaining differences and must be accounted for in reform proposals.
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5. Budgeting
“One snapshot of our capital outlay on an annual basis
 does not meet the needs of a modern state.”
Krist Lane,
Senate Committee for
Budget and Fiscal Review
Along with debt financing, the annual process of budgeting for
capital outlay dominates California’s infrastructure decisionmaking.
Shaping the capital outlay section of the Budget Act directly involves
nearly every major player responsible for the state’s infrastructure.  The
state’s capital outlay budget is based on an ad hoc blend of zero-based,
prior-year-based, and performance-based methods.  In practice, the prior
year’s requests overwhelm budget submissions, relegating performance
and zero-based methods to the background. A colloquial characterization
of the budget process is found in the California Constitution Revision
Commission (1996, p. 37):  “Try as one might, the natural law that
governs the budget process is: ‘You get what you got in the prior year,
plus growth.’”  Each department’s capital outlay budget request varies
markedly from those of its sister agencies.  This finding also holds true
for other capital management documents and processes.
The SAM Guides the Process to Questionable Ends
Most officials we interviewed questioned the quality and nature of
the budget process.  Many commented on the scant attention to capital
outlay compared to other sections of the Budget Bill, known as State
Operations (such as maintenance, equipment, and labor) and Local
Assistance (projects held under local ownership).  Capital outlay was in
“outer Siberia,” a “stepchild,” or an “afterthought.”  As one interviewee
put it, “There is no there there.”  Others remarked on the process itself,
calling it messy, fragmented, dysfunctional, bizarre, and micro-managed.
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That these same persons and others held the legislative and executive
budget staff in high esteem suggests that the problems lie in the
governing legislation, administrative regulations, and the lack of policy
guidance.  This suggestion prompted the following questions.  What do
we really get from our annual capital budgeting process, and how do
economic and financial forces sway these results?  If results can be
changed, can the process also be changed?  What are the implications of
using the SAM to guide the process?
Do Lists of Projects Make Good Budgets?
Put simply, the capital outlay budget process prioritizes projects.
Because resources are scarce, this process receives intense scrutiny.
Agencies compete fiercely for scarce resources; indeed, they often
compete several times over as projects go through the Department of
Finance, the governor’s office, both houses of the legislature, and
sometimes Congress or the ballot box.  The process is time-consuming
and political.  From district managers to the governor, players use
differing criteria to prepare, prioritize, and review the capital outlay
budget.
To prepare the annual capital outlay budget, the Department of
Finance solicits Capital Outlay Budget Change Proposals and Capitalized
Assets Plans from the agencies.  A Budget Change Proposal is required
for all capital projects proposed for the Governor’s Budget:  that is, for
any request for capital outlay appropriation and reappropriation.  A
Budget Change Proposal describes the project, its location, scope, time
line, cost, and justification.  Whereas agencies propose projects using
Capital Outlay Budget Change Proposals, legislators do so using Budget
Act amendments.  The Department of Finance, which is the governor’s
management and budgeting arm, works closely with agencies to prepare
their capital budget packages.  If a project is submitted as a legislative
amendment, it by-passes the agencies and the Department of Finance.
Otherwise, departments aggregate the project requests of their
subordinate units.  The Department of Finance then combines
departments’ requests into the state’s capital outlay budget.  After
weighing the agencies’ requests against the total funds foreseen to be
available, the DOF then selects the highest-priority projects for inclusion.
65
In so doing, the Department of Finance initiates a hierarchical chain
of budget requests:  Finance → Agency → Department → Division →
Branch → other smaller units.  Additionally, the departments initiate a
geographical chain of requests through Regions → Districts → Stations
→ other smaller field offices.  If capital outlay budgets are shaped in the
wake of weak policy guidance, they will usually be swamped by the
detailed and prescriptive procedural guidance used to hold line agencies
accountable.
The administration and other entities may fold their own criteria
into the process.  For example, projects responding to court orders,
licensing boards, and seismic and life safety issues are consistently given
priority by the governor, DOF, the Department of General Services, the
legislature, and the Legislative Analyst’s Office.  Aside from these criteria,
however, departments use their own standards for constructing their lists.
Some agencies, especially those with the largest capital planning and
budgeting staffs, use elaborate and quantified prioritization formulae to
rank projects.  The Departments of Water Resources and Health Services
prioritize wastewater treatment projects according to elaborate criteria
established by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.  State
University uses a three-category system, with several tiers in each
category.  The California Community College system is changing from a
three- to a six-category system with more than one tier in each category.
By working with Caltrans and regional transportation planning agencies,
the California Transportation Commission uses a weighted ranking
system that factors in cost, a safety index, a delay index, and other
criteria.  Other agencies, including some with smaller staffs, place
projects in rank order according to less elaborate procedures, policies,
and criteria.
Because departments prioritize projects differently, capital budget
packages vary substantially in their level of detail, comprehensiveness,
and justification.  Because of disparities among agencies, such as the
experience and training of infrastructure professionals, and the resources
allocated to capital planning and budgeting, decisions on funding end up
being influenced by the quality of the relations between agency and
Department of Finance staff.  Furthermore, in the absence of clear policy
or strategy from the administration, and because they are literally
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compiled as lists of individual projects, capital outlay budget requests
assume a “wish list” quality.
Consequently, prioritizing requests as they come up the chain is
sporadic and inconsistent.  In some departments, there is no filtering,
and all requests make it to the Department of Finance.  The Department
of Finance is left to judge departmental capital asset matters and, as time
permits, will engage departments in discussions to inform themselves
about each department’s program and problems.  However, the
Department of Finance is afforded little room to maneuver in the
exercise of this judgment, as little discretionary funding remains after
outlays for continuing projects are budgeted.  In such an escalating
scenario of competing priorities, only the fittest flourish.
In sum, each department has a “proprietary” priority ranking system.
If it is difficult, beyond issues of life safety, to discern a pattern in project
selection from the annual list of budget items for capital outlay, this is
because no central guidance for criteria exists.  According to our
interviews, the lack of a substantive statewide policy framework worked
together with detailed and prescriptive procedural guidance to produce
“wish lists” or “laundry lists” of infrastructure projects.
Legislative Exceptions to Priority Lists
The California EPA building and the East End Project, both under
construction in Sacramento, are two examples of major projects that are
being given greater detailed guidance on the part of the legislature.  They
are both part of a “design-build” program, and both acquired enabling
legislation separate from the annual budget.  Surfacing in times of
surplus, such projects tend to be large and out of the ordinary.  Like new
prisons, they may also be controversial.  Most are carried through the
legislature at the request of the administration, perhaps using the
legislature to avoid the Department of Finance’s competitive budgeting
process.  A DOF review eventually occurs, but it may take place under
the duress of a last-minute rush, especially in the case of so-called “pork
barrel” projects.  This review is conducted on behalf of the governor to
inform the governor’s signing and line item veto decisionmaking.
Legislators posting projects are not required to provide details to the
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Department of Finance.  Although cooperation is common, many such
projects obtain approval with little documented justification.
Just as legislators would like to read five-year plans and have greater
oversight in the typical capital outlay process, the Department of Finance
in its service to the governor would like more time to conduct reviews of
projects introduced by the legislature.  This tug-of-war is an age-old
condition of our system of checks and balances.  It is also likely to
heighten perceptions of inefficiency on the part of the voting public.  At
the same time, more and more projects are generated by the legislature
and the ballot box.  This trend brings into focus a well-known feature of
the capital budget process.  Initiating new projects, with their visible
advantages and ribbon-cutting ceremonies, is more glamorous than fixing
existing systems.
The Characters of Appropriation
Capital outlay is one of three “characters of appropriation” in the
governor’s budget that the Department of Finance defends in the
legislature.  The other two are State Operations and Local Assistance.  All
three characters of budget appropriation deal with infrastructure.  The
characters of appropriation are important because they determine which
expenditure rules will apply to a budgeted program or project.
Requests for infrastructure maintenance, repair, and rehabilitation,
can be found in capital outlay, State Operations (support), and Local
Assistance.  Alteration, addition, renovation, or betterment can fall under
both capital outlay and Local Assistance.  Maintenance, deferred
maintenance, repair and special repair, and equipment replacement fall
under State Operations.  Given the dispersal of all the sorts of
maintenance, repair, and rehabilitation across the budgets, it would be
laborious and difficult to calculate their total costs using current
budgetary management information systems.  Neither the executive nor
the legislative branch can provide summary statistics of aggregate
statewide expenditures for maintenance and repair, broadly construed.
The importance of these categories and definitions is straightforward.
When maintenance is segmented, scattered, compartmentalized, and
hidden in the budget, attention is diverted from it.  Because of its
treatment and standing in budget laws and accounting procedures,
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The Three Characters of Appropriation
Capital Outlay
The acquisition of land and real property, construction,
improvements, equipment, designs, plans, and repairs necessary in
connection with a construction or improvement project; including
alteration, renovation, or betterment which extends the life expectancy,
designed level of service, or alters/upgrades the function of a structure.
This includes lease-purchase, purchase option, and fixed and moveable
equipment needed for initial occupancy.
State Operations
(Capital-facility-related only—there are other categories of state
operations): equipment not needed for initial occupancy; moveable
equipment not part of capital outlay; replacement equipment; repairs,
maintenance, and deferred maintenance which keep a facility functional
at its designed level of services and life expectancy; relocation; leases and
rents except those with purchase or purchase option; and alterations for
leased facilities only.
Local Assistance
Grants to local agencies for the operation, maintenance, and
acquisition or development of facilities or land, provided that the local
entity retains ownership after the completion of the project.
These definitions are from California Department of Finance
(1999b, § 6806).
maintenance is a low priority.  As Lieutenant Governor Bustamante is
fond of saying, “You don’t get any ‘atta boys’ when you push
infrastructure.”  There are even fewer congratulations for pushing
infrastructure maintenance, whose significance is de-emphasized by
expenditure rules under each character of appropriation.  Legislation
requiring funds appropriated for maintenance to be spent on
maintenance have been vetoed.  Big backlogs have mounted into full-
blown new capital facilities needs, requiring replacement instead of
repair.
Even an entity with an otherwise accomplished record in
infrastructure management can accumulate large maintenance deficits.
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Such was the case with the University of California, which listed more
than $500 million in deferred maintenance in its 1997–1998 budget.
(This figure did not include seismic retrofits, which have been calculated
to exceed $1 billion for the Berkeley campus alone.)  The university’s
1999–2000 budget proposed to use debt service to retire a small fraction
of its deferred maintenance backlog—$60 million.  At this rate, however,
it is difficult to foresee how maintenance will be brought up to date.  The
university’s assessment attributes high levels of deferred maintenance to
three factors: annual underfunding for building maintenance, a lack of
permanent funding for deferred maintenance, and insufficient resources
from the capital improvement budget for replacing worn-out building
systems.1  The university is far from unique.  It is instead emblematic of
the state of the state’s capital facilities’ maintenance.
Experimenting with Performance-Based Budgeting
In principle, the capital budget is zero-based.  In fact, it is based on
prior capital plans and on continuing appropriations to approved
projects that are in the pipeline.  There are other bases on which to draw
up a budget.  One, a performance basis, has been tried in California and
elsewhere.  The Wilson administration tested performance-based
budgeting in four departments with a pilot program. The initial intent
was for departments to use their strategic plans to guide performance
budgets.  The tests obtained mixed results, with the exception of the
Department of Parks and Recreation, which continues to use a
performance basis.  Departments other than the four involved in the
pilot program have had sporadic experience in performance-based
budgeting.
This innovation has been more fruitful when mandated by a federal
program or suggested by an outside consultant following an in-house
audit.  The Department of Water Resources wastewater treatment capital
program, based on the U.S. EPA’s Safe Drinking Water Act, is an
example of the former.  The Caltrans State Transportation Improvement
Plan makes use of both, as it is based on the U.S. Department of
Transportation’s Transportation Equity Act (TEA 21) and, increasingly,
____________ 
1University of California (1998b), p. 28.
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a study from Stanford Research Institute (SRI).  In addition, the STIP is
perhaps the state’s best instance of a budget linked directly to a long-term
capital plan.  California State University’s 1995 Coopers Lybrand study
and the California Department of Education’s 1988 Price Waterhouse
study led to capital budget process reforms that have reaped significant
time and cost savings.  Both reform efforts serve as models for other
agencies as they strive to change their practices.
The UC system introduced performance goals into its budget with
the advent of the compact it and CSU made with the governor and the
legislature.  It committed to honor a list of “important goals” that aim to
maintain the quality of academic programs and to help California remain
competitive in the global economy.  Many of the goals of the first
compact for 1995–1998 have been attained or exceeded.2  UC and CSU
are currently working on a second compact—Compact II—with the
governor and the legislature.  On the other side of the coin, the
California Education Facilities Authority (CEFA) and the California
Health Facilities Financing Authority (CHAFA) conduct no
performance reviews, feasibility studies, or benefit-cost analyses for the
projects they finance.  They serve as mere funding conduits and only
ensure that financial criteria for loan payback are met.
Even without innovations in performance-based budgeting, the
capital outlay budget is more detailed than the State Operations budget.
Not only is capital budgeting done project by project, but many projects
are cost-estimated in exquisite detail.  Other projects only have
conceptual cost estimates.  Substantial work must be completed on
preliminary plans and working drawings before a project’s construction
cost estimates are placed in the budget.  By contrast, the State Operations
budget is no longer prepared at the line-item level but rather by general
programmatic categories.  For example, the CSU system calculates its
support budget by a marginal cost per full-time enrolled student (FTE)
basis.  The fact that the capital outlay budget contains more detail than
the State Operations budget seems counterintuitive, as capital
expenditures are for large items and operations expenses are for small
____________ 
2University of California (1998b), p. 19.
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ones.  Moreover, the capital outlay budget is more than an order of
magnitude smaller than the support budget.
Our research revealed pros and cons regarding a project-based versus
a program-based capital budget.  With its multiple approvals, the project
approach consumes more time but enables more accurate costing and
pre-construction oversight.  A program approach allows for speed and
flexibility and encourages creative innovations from programming and
financing to budgeting and construction.  This approach would satisfy
one capital manager, who told us “The state’s capital budgeting process is
too long.  By the time we get a building built, the needs change.”  This
capital manager is not alone.  Many observers close to the process are
asking whether a project-by-project budget makes sense in today’s
environment.
Other Ways to Think About Budgeting
Funding priority is now determined by ranking projects in
comparison to one another.  There is no overarching state strategy
against which the capital outlay budget could be measured.  Instead, it is
fashioned by weak policy guidance in a decentralized institutional
environment.  “As a result,” the LAO notes, “capital investment decisions
are made more on an ad hoc basis.  Funding proposals are often
considered without an overall sense as to how any proposal fits within
statewide needs and priorities” (LAO, 1998a, p. 2).
An alternative system would compare, prioritize, and adjudicate
between capital programs according to more general social goals.  To
illustrate this point, consider comparative costs between prisons and
higher education.  According to the Department of Finance, capital costs
per inmate exceed capital costs per student for the ten-year period 1999–
2008  (Tables 5.1 and 5.2).  Capital costs per prisoner exceeded those for
a full-time community college student by over six to one.  This
comparison does not consider the annual operating expenses per inmate,
which come to $20,758.  Nor does it consider research revenues and
royalties generated by higher education.  In 1997–1998 alone, the
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Table 5.1














(FTE) 159,000 147,000 276,000 917,000
2008 population
(FTE) 246,000 192,000 352,000 1,125,000
Population increase
1999–2008 87,000 45,000 76,000 208,000
Ten-year capital needs
($ millions) 9,500 5,300 4,900 7,100
Capital costs
per capita ($) 38,618 27,604 13,920 6,311
SOURCE:  California Department of Finance (1999a, Chapter 3).
Table 5.2
1998 Construction Cost per Inmate,












SOURCE:  California Department
of Corrections (1998, Table E, p. 4-4).
73
University of California and the national laboratories it manages
produced $4 billion of such revenue.3
The current planning and budgeting system also overlooks other
factors.  One is geographical.  Every project has a place, yet this
fundamental fact does not figure in the system.  Prioritization by project
alone overlooks whether the sizable gains that accrue from infrastructure
investment benefit urban, suburban, rural, or environmental areas
disproportionately.  No map indicates where projects have been built,
much less where they ought to be built.  Another missing factor is social
equity.  Except within the confines of particular programs in selected
departments, social equity criteria are not explicitly accounted for in the
budget.  Report after report has demonstrated that the gap in California
between rich and poor is widening.4  The current approach to funding
and locating capital investments has done little to narrow this gap in any
systematic way.
How Financing Constrains the Budget Process
California’s capital budgeting system is as competitive as it is because
it is constrained by the amount of funds available.  Funding availability is
determined by the fiscal position of the state and the efficacy of the
financing mechanisms in place.  Although the state has little control over
the economy, which determines its fiscal condition, it has full control
over what means it chooses to finance infrastructure.  With few
exceptions (such as the gas, diesel, and weight taxes), the state has relied
on long-term debt, which is not discretionary.  As a result, the budget
process itself cannot easily allocate money to a long and expensive list of
needs.  When there are no dollars available, little attention is given to
capital outlay.  In surplus years, it is the center of debate.  This is a broad
hint at how financing influences the system.  Voicing a common view
throughout state government, Pat Drohan, Assistant Vice Chancellor for
____________ 
3Capital projections are from the California Department of Finance (1999a,
Chapter 3).  Operating costs and revenues are from the California Department of
Corrections (1998, p. 4-5), and the University of California Office of the President
(1998b).
4Reed, Haber, and Mameesh (1996); Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt (1999).
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Capital Planning, Design and Construction for the CSU system, referred
to this as “the tail wagging the dog approach.”
This trend toward long-term debt has increased markedly since the
passage of Proposition 13, which also increased the degree of voter-
imposed controls over public spending.  With fewer dollars to go around,
more have been leveraged out in the form of general obligation (GO)
bonds.  The total amount of GO bonds approved at the polls has risen
from around $1 billion throughout the 1970s to a high of $9.2 billion in
1998 (State of California, 1999, p. 23).  One trend has been to propose
projects that will be built so far into the future that they do not concern
today’s voters.  For example, the legislature recently passed a 20-year
process for private and nonprofit hospitals to obtain funding for seismic
retrofits.  Although preliminary cost estimates are close to $24 billion for
for-profit hospitals alone, first plans are not due until 2001 and work is
not scheduled to start until 2008.  The scale of such proposals stands in
stark relief to those in the years before Proposition 13.  In particular, they
show the degree to which the capital budget is dependent on both long-
term financing and voter attitudes.
The Capital Budget Surfs the Economic Wave
The economic cycle helps set a pattern for the types and amounts of
projects funded from year to year.  Fluctuations in economic prosperity
have caused what amounts to a “boom or bust” mentality in
infrastructure decisionmaking.  The pattern has been cyclical to the point
of being predictable.  In lean years, departments as well as central
agencies or the legislature try to do more with less.  Faced with operating
budget cuts, departments sometimes use funds normally reserved for
maintenance to retain staff.  Schools raise the pupil-teacher ratio.  Prisons
increase the number of inmates per cell.  The Department of Water
Resources devoted resources to educating the public on water
conservation.  Caltrans and Regional Transportation Planning Agencies
tried to pack more autos safely into the same number of lanes and to
encourage drivers to switch to public transit.  In times of anticipated or
realized surplus, such as in recent years, proposals pour in to the
Department of Finance from departments that had deferred maintenance
to the point of requiring major renovations or whole new facilities.  Local
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assistance projects also streamed in from legislators hoping to satisfy their
constituents and alleviate some of the post-Proposition 13 financial
burdens on their local governments.
There are many sound reasons for these patterns.  Inflation tends to
have a greater effect on construction than on other industries.  If
maintenance or new projects are deferred in lean years, everyone
scrambles to cut into the surplus in times of plenty.  In general, surpluses
have coincided with low unemployment and rising material and labor
costs.  Knowing that the state must compete with the private sector for
contractors of all sorts, there has been great pressure to secure
appropriations, expand staff, and secure contractors as rapidly as possible.
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6. Conclusions and Policy
Implications
We found that the state’s capital management system still works but
needs repair and updating.  In this, it is like California’s infrastructure.
Some parts of the system are sound but would benefit from a clearer
policy framework to enhance judgments in support of future growth and
social equity.  For example, procedural adjustments to the budget process
would afford significant efficiency gains in project approval and
management.  Two related parts of the system, planning and financing,
function in reverse.  The availability of financial resources rather than
social demands define what infrastructure is “needed.”  In this way,
finance has constrained infrastructure development.  This effect is
compounded by the fact that the state of the art in public capital finance
techniques lags behind that in the private sector.
Some regard this state of affairs as the realpolitik of infrastructure
management in California.  Others see it as prudent.  On the basis of our
research, however, we conclude that this approach has really been a
détente that led to over 20 years of stasis in the evolution of
infrastructure planning, budgeting, and financing.  Some refinements
have recently been passed into law (AB 1473).  Others are being
considered as of this writing: Assembly Bill 636 (Migden and Thomson),
Senate Bill 915 (Peace et al.), and Senate Constitutional Amendment 9
(Peace and McPherson).1  Although these bills address procedure, they
do not go far enough in recognizing the larger forces at play in day-to-
day infrastructure decisionmaking and management.
____________ 
1There are many other bills in both houses that deal with specific elements of
infrastructure.  They include transportation (SB 315 and SCA 3 (both Burton and
Karnette)) and the Infrastructure and Economic Development Bank (SB 512 (Alarcon)
and SB 808 (Peace)).
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As we studied infrastructure policy and management, we found that
the “system” is intelligible to insiders, opaque to outsiders, and not as
intelligent as it could be.  The fact that it is understood by specialists and
not by citizens has a profound and pervasive consequence.  Californians
participate in a limited way in infrastructure decisions.  This opacity
partly reflects public attitudes.  “Traffic and transportation” and “water”
were at or near the bottom of a list of 18 issues facing California that
were “most important for the governor and the legislature to work on in
1999.  As a political topic, infrastructure tends to be dull.  At least for the
moment, however, political interest is high, creating room for effective
leadership.
Insiders’ perceptions of the system provide clues to how the system
functions and malfunctions, and they also offer cues to reform.  This can
be seen in the two prevailing metaphors for describing the system,
besides the black box.  Those who saw the system as a puzzle said they
knew their own piece and a few others but not how the pieces fit
together.  Those who saw the system as a wheel viewed the policy
framework as the rim, the administration as the hub, and the spokes as
the agencies.  Most often, they perceived the wheel as having a flimsy
hub and no rims.  They were also the clearest about what was necessary
to correct inadequacies: namely, a stronger hub and rim.
Key Characteristics of Infrastructure Decisionmaking
We found that three characteristics of infrastructure management
override all others.  The first is its project-orientation.  The state’s capital
planning, budgeting, and financing are conducted mostly project by
project.  Each department or agency prepares plans for specific capital
projects such as prisons, schools, bridges, or hospitals.  It then aggregates
these proposals and presents the list as its overall plan.  As a result of this
approach, California is relatively strong on project planning by individual
agencies and weak on statewide planning and strategy.  Indeed, the
administration lacks both an infrastructure planning culture and a legal
structure to enable it.  Instead, each agency has its own planning
practices.  As state government becomes more complex, the
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disparities across agencies carry with them the costs of fragmentation.  In
particular, coordination becomes more expensive as departments,
agencies, and other interest groups proliferate.
The influence of the annual budget process is another feature of the
state’s approach to infrastructure decisionmaking.  Insofar as the system
is project-oriented, it is guided by the details of the budget process rather
than by broad policy goals.  Indeed, that process provides no formal
mechanism for evaluating projects against one another or matching them
to overarching state priorities.  Consequently, it rewards short-term
budget balancing rather than long-term asset management.  Because the
budget process is an annual snapshot, it does not anticipate or respond
well to changes in the business cycle.  As a result, the state loses the
ability to control construction costs and offset economic downswings
with public works spending.
The third major characteristic of infrastructure decisionmaking is
that it is finance-driven.  Over and above the DOF’s role in the annual
budget process, finances tend to drive the system at every stage.  Indeed,
the availability of funds determines program needs rather than vice versa.
This approach to infrastructure decisionmaking is simple, easy to follow,
and deceptive.  It tells the story backward by defining social needs
according to the state’s current budget.  It also tends to neglect
assessment and regular maintenance in favor of crisis management.
Finally, it emphasizes a single financial instrument, long-term debt, and
ignores other financial options that could help close the gap between
identified needs and available funds.  By focusing on a small set of
financial factors, the current approach avoids looking at California’s
infrastructure system as a whole (see Table 6.1).
Table 6.1
California’s Infrastructure Institution:  Key Variables and Vacuums
Prominent Features Missing Pieces
Finance driven Demand and need shaping budget
Budget process steers system Strategic framework to guide system
Project basis Program basis to guide planning, budget
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Specific Findings
1.  Identified infrastructure needs outstrip available resources.  The
current policy debate proceeds from this consensus view.
2.  Infrastructure decisionmaking occurs in complex networks.  These
networks, which have developed incrementally, do not always serve
the state well. Unraveling the whole that these interlocking
networks form—a kind of institutional surgery—is a painstaking
process.  Recent and current attempts at reform have cut open parts
but not the whole.  This piecemeal approach has been a direct
outcome of the bias of the system toward projects and the lack of a
statewide strategy.
3.  The definition of infrastructure is changing.  Infrastructure used to
be pipes, wires, and roads provided by the government.  Now it
includes land and buildings, information systems and satellites, and
a spectrum of public and private services.  Ownership and
responsibility are less clear; partnerships and problems are more
common.
4.  Competition for infrastructure resources is the inevitable by-
product of project-based financing and budgeting.  In the absence
of big-picture planning, the legislature has become involved in
details rather than in long-term leadership and oversight.
5.  A complicated formal system shapes the budget, but that system
lacks a mechanism for dealing with substantive tradeoffs.  The
current system relies on departmental planning, DOF oversight, and
legislative control over the budget.  The governor and legislature
lack the information necessary to easily compare needs across
departments outside the current budget year, or address issues
beyond financial feasibility, such as social, regional, or income
equality.
6.  There is no life-cycle framework for infrastructure.  The current
approach favors financing and budgeting over planning and
assessing.  As a result, it overvalues short-term planning and new
projects and undervalues maintenance.  Systematic, cradle-to-grave
planning is missing.
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7.  The current system ignores the effects of the business cycle.  As a
result, the state cannot offset economic downswings or use
fluctuations strategically to control construction costs.
8.  Information for capital decisions is limited.  The State
Administrative Manual specifies the content of Capital Outlay
Budget Change Proposals, the core data in the budget process.  The
Capital Outlay and Infrastructure Report and the Debt Affordability
Report (typically) have provided a debt capacity orientation to
policymakers.  Departments’ five-year capital plans and strategic
plans are not part of legislative review of the budget, with the
exception of the Legislative Analyst’s Office.
9.  Information is erratic and biased in unpredictable ways.  Each
agency uses its own methods for planning and justifying its own
budget.  The quality of that information depends on the size,
expertise, and resources of the agency.
10. Resources dedicated to infrastructure management vary widely
among agencies.  There is no centralized source for training and no
centralized sources for the professional development of
infrastructure managers and staff.  Retaining expert staff, especially
project managers, is difficult in the face of private sector
competition in a strong economy.
Institutional Design for Infrastructure Management
The ultimate challenge for infrastructure reform is institutional
design.  Like a conductor without a score or an orchestra, changes to the
budget process or the bond process are hamstrung.  Listening to music is
a seamless experience.  We hear music and not the studio, the conductor,
and so on.  We use infrastructure seamlessly as well.  We do not
necessarily know or care when a phone line or local street becomes an
optical signal, digital transmission, or microwave relay, or a county road,
state highway, or federal freeway.  We just want to communicate and get
there.
The collectivity of organizations that manage infrastructure in
California is not seamless.  Agencies plan and operate independently, for
the most part.  Networks are fragmented and coordination is limited.
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Decentralization and devolution have happened without an overall
design that assigned commensurate accountability and responsibility.
Our fragmented institutions suffer without the benefit of a guiding
document that articulates a single strategy.  They suffer without effective
coordination from a single entity.
We found that the transaction costs needed to overcome these
systemic institutional deficiencies are high.  In high-risk and high-
uncertainty situations, attending transaction costs will remain high.  In
most other scenarios, they could be lowered substantially.  Transaction
costs are measured in the time, staff, resources, information, and
coordination costs to manage a “transaction,” or in the case of
government, a program.  Institutional redesign can factor in transaction
costs as it reconsiders infrastructure management options.
A responsive institutional methodology answers these challenges with
an open systems architecture that values flow and coordination over
checkpoints and control.  This approach points to a new sort of
coordination agency, one that serves as a central information processor.
Although AB 1473 positions the DOF for just such a role, at the
moment there is no central processing, strategic thinking, or information
management system.  Instead, these functions are diffused among several
entities: Finance, General Services, Treasury, and the governor’s office.
A responsive institution incorporates the principles outlined here by
considering the roles and responsibilities of each player, especially the
structural and procedural links among them, in the context of the entire
polity.
Keeping a loose and dispersed set of networks working together is
partly a matter of institutional design.  It is also a matter of having an
adaptable, accessible management information system that cuts across
organizational lines, and a coherent strategy that makes efficient use of
the system.  The passage of AB 1473 may mark a step in the right
direction, but its success hinges on the design of new implementing
regulations. A framework with strong principles and a process that is
both iterative and interactive is better suited to California’s governance
than a standard, universal, detailed prescription that applies uniformly to
all.
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Life-Cycle Capital Investment Management
The raw materials of the infrastructure system have the makings of a
complete capital investment management system.  This system would
adopt a life-cycle approach to infrastructure: assess, plan, design, budget,
finance, build, operate, maintain and repair, rehabilitate and modernize,
and re-assess (see Figure 6.1).  This presentation does not imply strict
serial order, as some activities would occur simultaneously.  Some state
agencies have already begun life-cycle programs.  In effect, Caltrans has
the elements of a life-cycle system with its State Transportation
Improvement Plan, State Highway Operations and Protection Plan, and
dedicated state and federal revenue streams.  With more emphasis on
planning (especially land use and demand management), expanding
dedicated revenues, and integrating its systems, the department would be
very close to achieving this goal.
Life-cycle capital investment management has implications for
institutional design and information management as well.  This is true
for both the administration and line agencies.  To continue with the
Caltrans example, it has reorganized into five core areas that match its
view of the life cycle:  planning, operations, maintenance, capital outlay,
and local assistance.  (These also match, in part, the characters of budget
appropriation.)  Each core area prepares its own strategic business plan.
A review of all capital management activities by the management and
budget arms of the executive branch would inform the apportioning of
duties within a life-cycle framework.
Perhaps the most critical link in the life-cycle chain, at least in
California, is finance.  The debt accounting process now in force does
not allow for two critical functions.  The first is an automatic funding
mechanism that provides consistent and routine revenue flows for the
entire life of an infrastructure program.  The second is a type of sinking
or revolving fund that pays for continual maintenance and upgrades over
the lifetime of a facility.  A dedicated percentage of debt service would
automatically be deposited into this fund.2
____________ 
2Another revenue-generating option, albeit minor, is to design state office buildings
along commercial streets to have ground floor businesses.  This has been the policy in





















Figure 6.1—Life-Cycle Capital Investment Management
A life-cycle administrative support system could be retooled from the
existing pieces.  The biggest return on investment, in our estimation,
would be in the area of management information systems (MIS).  Efforts
already under way set the stage for more complete coordination and
integration.  The Statewide Property Inventory is one database for a life-
cycle MIS.  In its context, Budget Change Proposals are Inventory
Change Proposals.  DGS’s Project Management System and Department
of Finance’s emerging Capital Outlay Project Tracking System cover
components of a comprehensive package.  A valuable model that has
been used effectively for decades is the Materiel Maintenance
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Management (3M) system of the military.  Administrative regulations are
central to information management and ought to consider life-cycle
parameters.  This includes definitions of infrastructure and how they are
treated in the characters of appropriation.
Any life-cycle system would have to be adaptable by the plethora of
client departments.
The Changing Public-Private Interface
This study was completed in conjunction with another PPIC study
regarding mechanisms to finance California’s infrastructure (Dowall,
2000).  When read together, these studies reveal vast changes under way
in government, private sector, and nonprofit entities in their roles as
infrastructure providers.  Increasingly strapped governmental agencies are
finding more ways to leverage private and nonprofit participation in
finance, design, construction, management, and operations.  California is
no exception to this trend.
The University of California has been implementing design-build
contracts for campus projects for many years.  UC staff has found that
certain types of projects lend themselves well to this form of contracting,
where the project design and construction occur under one contract
(largely on a lump-sum basis).  When done properly, design-build
reduces project costs and schedules by removing an entire bid cycle from
the development process, giving greater participation in the development
process to a single contractor or consortium of contractors.  In turn, UC
has been working closely with the Department of General Services,
which also sees benefits in negotiating closely with contractors on a
continuous basis between design and construction.
While it is easy to visualize the benefits for relatively simple and standard
designs, the state is also taking on more complex efforts, such as the
Capitol Area East End Project in Sacramento, as part of an overall pilot
program investigating the potential for design-build.  Any program that
shares risks between government and the private sector will require
increased mutual understanding of those risks to be successful.  Like any
new complex endeavor, there is a steep learning curve.  In the short run,
design-build projects, especially large and complex ones, may take more
time to complete, until experience is gained and lessons are learned.  If
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our initial review of the legislature’s role in the budget process is any
indication, an environment of intensive and detailed oversight could spell
high costs for this pilot program.
The UC and the legislature are not the only state entities embarking
on more engaging relations with the private sector.  State Route 91 in
Orange County is one of several pilot projects for Caltrans and the
California Transportation Commission in private transportation
development.  The State Treasurer’s Office maintains perhaps the closest
links to several private and nonprofit providers of infrastructure by
providing financing for education and health care through CEFA and
CHAFA.  How well do these programs fare?  Infrastructure financing is
undergoing a sea change.  California’s lawmakers would be well served to
investigate these changes.
Every Project Has a Place:  The Geographic
Imperative for Infrastructure
The purpose of infrastructure is to make the places humans inhabit
more livable and productive.  A municipality’s general plan connects
infrastructure to the future growth and quality of that place.  This link is
being reinforced by the rules governing the California Infrastructure and
Economic Development Bank, which provides state funding aid to local
infrastructure projects.  A potential link at the state level and between the
state and local jurisdictions exists in the form of the State Environmental
Goals and Policy Report, produced by the governor.  This report is out of
date and not in use.  Aside from the treasurer’s Smart Investments
(Angelides, 1999), no other statewide policy document regards the
spatial aspects of infrastructure.  The geography of infrastructure is the
missing link in California infrastructure planning today.  Infrastructure is
the most visible contribution government can make to the state’s growth.
Infrastructure guides where, how much, and what kind of growth can
occur.  The current budgeting process should account for the geographic
growth implications of infrastructure investments.
As California enters the next century, hundreds of billions of dollars
will be spent on infrastructure in the first decades to shape its future.  To
match its history and fulfill its continuing promise as the Golden State,
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its citizens expect their leaders to make the right choices.  In this light,
infrastructure planning and management reform is a small price to pay
for such a big and vital payoff.
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Appendix A
List of Persons Interviewed
Cliff Allenby Interim Director, California Department of
General Services
Larry Aull Director, State Capital Program Development,
Office of the President, University of California
Susan Baltake Executive Director, California Education
Facilities Authority, State Treasurer’s Office
Gerald Beavers Director, Business, Labor and Capital Outlay,
Legislative Analyst’s Office
Katie Benouar Senior Transportation Planner, New
Technology and Research, California
Department of Transportation
Sue Bost Principal Program Budget Analyst, Assistant
Administrative Secretary to the Public Works
Board, Department of Finance
Duwayne Brookes Director, School Facilities Planning Division,
California Department of Education
John Brooks Chief, Asset Planning and Enhancement
Branch, California Department of General
Services
Jeff Brown Consultant, Senate Office of Research,
California Legislature
Marc Carrel Senior Advisor to the Lieutenant Governor,
Office of Cruz M. Bustamante
Sarah Catz Deputy Secretary, State of California
Transportation, Business and Housing Agency
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Gail Chong Associate Government Program Analyst,
Budget Office, California Department of Water
Resources
Kirk Clark Program Director, California Business
Roundtable
Dale Claypoole Deputy Director, California State Water
Resources Control Board
Judy Corbett Executive Director, Local Government
Commission
Curtis Creel Engineering Assistant to Chief Deputy
Director, Executive, California Department of
Water Resources
Diane Cummins Chief Fiscal Policy Advisor, Office of Senator
John L. Burton, President Pro Tempore
John Decker Budget Director, Assembly Speaker’s Budget
Office
Ken DeCrescenzo Supervising Transportation Planner, California
Department of Transportation, and staff
member of the Commission on Building for the
21st Century
Lyle Defenbaugh Metropolitan West Securities
Peter Detwiler Consultant, Senate Local Government
Committee
Patrick Drohan Assistant Vice Chancellor, California State
University
Steve Erie Associate Professor, University of California at
San Diego, and member of the Commission on
Building for the 21st Century
Karen Finn Principal Program Budget Analyst, California
Department of Finance
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Natasha Fooman Legislative Representative, California League of
Cities
Mike Ford Principal Engineer, California Department of
Water Resources, Division of Planning
Fred Harris Administrator, Facilities Planning Unit,
California Community Colleges Chancellor’s
Office
Bill Hauck President, California Business Roundtable
Phillip Isenberg Attorney at Law, Hyde, Miller, Owen & Trost
Dave Jones Legislative Representative, California League of
Cities
Fred Klass Program Budget Manager, Department of
Finance
Krist Lane Senate Committee on Budget and Fiscal
Review
Julia Lave Johnston Program Manager, Local Government
Commission
Jeanine Jones Chief, Statewide Planning Division, California
Department of Water Resources, Division of
Planning
Gary Lotspeich Chief, Budget Office, Division of Fiscal
Services, California Department of Water
Resources
Larry Magid Executive Director, California Alternative
Energy and Advanced Transportation
Financing Authority, State Treasurer’s Office
Lynne March Chief, Intermodal ITS Branch, New
Technology and Research, California
Department of Transportation
Judy McGillivray Deputy Director, Planning and Construction
Division, California Department of Corrections
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Mehdi Morshed Executive Director, California High-Speed Rail
Authority
Diane Munso Chief, Construction Support Branch, Planning
and Construction Division, California
Department of Corrections
Chuck Nicol Principal Consultant, Assembly Appropriations
Committee, Office of Assemblywoman Carole
Migden
Debra Obley Director of Budget, University of California,
Office of the President
David Pane Assistant Fiscal Policy Advisor, Office of
Senator John L. Burton, President Pro
Tempore
Terry Partington Deputy Executive Director, California
Educational Facilities Authority and California
Health Facilities Financing Authority, State
Treasurer’s Office
Richard Powers Chief, Facility Services, Planning and
Construction Division, California Department
of Corrections
Robert Remen Executive Director, California Transportation
Commission
Jay Riley Chief, Office of Advanced Program Planning,
California Department of Transportation
Lorri Silva Safe Drinking Water Manager, Budget Office,
California Department of Water Resources
George Smith New Technology and Research, California
Department of Transportation
Nathan Smith Chief, Office of State Planning, California
Department of Transportation, Transportation
Planning Program
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Sumi Sousa Executive Director, California Health Facilities
Financing Authority, State Treasurer’s Office
Sharon Sprowls Policy Consultant, California Futures Network
Dwight Stenbakken Government Affairs Director, California
League of Cities
James Tilton Assistant Program Budget Manager, California
Department of Finance, and Administrative
Secretary to the Public Works Board
Diane van Maren Associate Secretary, Health and Human
Services Agency
Liz West Senior Consultant, Assemblyman Torlakson’s
Office




The following questions were sent to all the interviewees during the
conduct of this research.
“The questions contained herein are designed to support research
sponsored by the Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC), a private,
nonprofit organization dedicated to independent, nonpartisan research
on economic, social, and political issues that affect the lives of
Californians.  The research will be published by the PPIC in a research
report titled Building California’s Future:  Current Conditions in
Infrastructure Planning, Budgeting, and Financing.  We are interested in
the current status or situation as it exists now, as well as how the status or
situation may have changed over time.”
1. Who coordinates infrastructure in your agency?  (Office and
individual(s))
2. Which agency/organization coordinates infrastructure for the State
of California?  Does any agency handle a specific piece of it and not
the entire infrastructure question, such as planning, budgeting, or
financing?
3.  How does your agency/organization relate and coordinate with the
agency you identified in question 2?
4.  What is your agency’s/organization’s definition of infrastructure?
What elements are included, and which are excluded?
5.  Has the definition changed over time?  If so, how?
6.  How is infrastructure planning done in your agency?  Who/which
office is responsible?  Is the planning summed up in a plan, strategy,
or other document?  Who approves or adopts it?  What is the role of
local and regional entities in your infrastructure planning process?
7. How are infrastructure needs calculated in your agency?
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• Is it a needs-based calculation or a demand-based calculation?
• Capital needs alone?
• Capital and operations and maintenance needs together?
• Functional or geographic basis?
• Time horizon?
• Life-cycle basis?
• Linked to plan, strategy, program?
• Linked to growth, population, jobs, housing, etc., projections?
• Which/whose projections?  How are they reconciled with other
state projections?
• Linked to (current/forecasted) operating revenues?
• Linked to current/projected bond measures?
8.  How are infrastructure priorities determined by your agency?  How
are those priorities reconciled with those of the State of California?
What other agencies/organizations/jurisdictions do you coordinate
with to determine your agency’s priorities?
9.  Is all the infrastructure under the purview of your agency included
in your capital budget?  If not, which budget is it in?
10. Is capital budgeting done in conjunction with your operating
budget?
11. What is your agency’s annual capital budget?  What is your agency’s
annual total budget?  How long have these budget data been kept?
12. What is the time horizon for your agency’s capital budget?
13. How are infrastructure/capital budgets determined in your agency?
What is the capital budget approval process?  How are decisions
reached?  How are conflicts resolved?  What is the role of local and
regional entities in your capital budgeting process?
14. How does your agency coordinate with the Department of Finance
and other appropriate agencies, including the Governor’s Office and
the Legislature?
15. How is the infrastructure managed?  (Life-cycle approach?  Other
system such as planning, programming, budgeting?)
16. How is infrastructure financed?  Indicate all that apply.  Indicate
which infrastructure is financed by which method, and indicate the
percentage of your agency’s total capital budget financed by each
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method.  Do data exist that show how these percentages have
changed over time?
• General fund
• General obligation bonds
• Revenue bonds
• Tax increment financing
• User fees
• Grants from the federal government, other
• Public-private partnerships
• Development impact fees
• Local sales tax option
• Fuel tax
• Other
17. Does your agency ever initiate bond measures for capital needs?
What is the process by which your agency works with the
Governor’s Office and the Legislature on capital bond measures?
Does your agency get involved with bond measures initiated by
citizens?
18. How are infrastructure data gathered?  Managed?  Used?
• Gathered by staff, or contracted to consultants?
• If contracted, are the contractors private sector or university
affiliated?
19. Who is responsible for infrastructure data collection and
management in your agency?  Who is responsible for the State of
California?
20. How are infrastructure data gathered?  Managed?  Used?
• Are infrastructure data gathered on a geographic basis?
• Are they gathered on a functional basis?
• How often is the information collected/calculated?
• How is it recorded and maintained?
• What are the typical uses of these data?
21. Are there existing needs or gaps as regards infrastructure data?
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22. What percentage of the capital budget is dedicated to/spent on:




• Operations and maintenance
• Record keeping/database management
• Public health and safety
• Rehabilitation/seismic upgrade
23. What are the obstacles to infrastructure planning, budgeting,
financing, and coordination?
24. What role do politicians play in the planning, budgeting, and
financing of infrastructure as it affects your agency/organization?
What role should politicians play?
25. What are the most important forums to debate infrastructure needs
and priorities?  Why?  Who are the major stakeholders that should
be involved?
26. What are the most important arenas that decide infrastructure
needs, priorities, budgeting, and funding? Who are the major
stakeholders that should be involved?
27. How would you characterize the state’s overall capital planning,
budgeting, and financing processes?  How would you characterize
your agency’s capital planning, budgeting, and financing processes?
28. Are you satisfied with the current infrastructure decisionmaking
process?  What would you recommend to improve it?  (Incentives,
sanctions, etc.)
Documentation to be gathered from each agency
1.  Infrastructure and capital policy, planning, and strategy documents.
2.  Demographic, economic, and other pertinent projections and
forecasts.
3.  Capital and operating budget documents.
4.  Laws and other documents authorizing infrastructure and capital
financing programs and mechanisms.
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Statewide documentation to be gathered
5.  Statewide Property Inventory SPI—computerized.
6.  Department of Finance Capital Outlay and Infrastructure Report—
annual.
7.  Treasurer’s Debt Affordability Report—annual.
8.  Governor’s Budget and Budget Summary
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